Cited by 317Smart Grid Security and ResilienceStability and Control of Uncertain SystemsInformation and Cyber Security

Secure Control Systems: A Quantitative Risk Management Approach

Andre M. H. Teixeira, Kin Cheong Sou, Henrik Sandberg, Karl Henrik Johansson·2015·IEEE Control Systems

Abstract

Critical infrastructures must continuously operate safely and reliably, despite a variety of potential system disturbances. Given their strict operating requirements, such systems are automated and controlled in real time by several digital controllers receiving measurements from sensors and transmitting control signals to actuators. Since these physical systems are often spatially distributed, there is a need for information technology (IT) infrastructures enabling the timely data flow between the system components. These networked control systems are ubiquitous in modern societies [1]. Examples include the electric power network, intelligent transport systems, and industrial processes.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/mcs.2014.2364709

Cites

63 of 63 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Teixeira et al. proposed that detection and mitigation of stealthy attacks requires verification mechanisms that operate at the data origin at the sensor level rather than at intermediate network monitoring points.

    “Teixeira et al. extended this analysis to propose that detection and mitigation of stealthy attacks requires verification mechanisms that operate at the data origin at the sensor level rather than at intermediate network monitoring points, a principle embodied in the device-level telemetry signing requirement of the proposed architecture.[31]”
  • Teixeira et al. proposed co-design frameworks that treat security and functional safety as joint optimization objectives rather than sequential design concerns.

    “Teixeira et al. further formalized the safety-security tension in industrial systems, proposing co-design frameworks that treat security and functional safety as joint optimization objectives rather than sequential design concerns an approach that directly informs the three principles below.[31]”
  • Teixeira et al. provide a formal treatment of the asymmetry between false-positive security block and false-negative miss in safety-critical cyber-physical systems, supporting the design decision to preserve safety function continuity as the overriding constraint at those boundaries.

    “Teixeira et al. provide a formal treatment of this asymmetry in safety-critical cyberphysical systems, supporting the design decision to preserve safety function continuity as the overriding constraint at those boundaries.[31]”

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Authors
Teixeira, A. M. H., Sou, K. C., Sandberg, H., & Johansson, K. H.
Affiliations
  • KTH Royal Institute of Technology (SE)
  • Chalmers University of Technology (SE)
  • Swedish Research Council (SE)
Venue
IEEE Control Systems
Published
2015-02
Volume
35
Issue
1
Pages
24-45
ISSN
  • 1066-033X (ISSN-L)
  • 1941-000X
OpenAlex
W1987806716
Cited by
316
References
64
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 36 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 30 · 2015: 10
FWCI
29.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • IEEE Control Systems (publishedVersion)
  • CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
  • Lund University Publications (Lund University) (submittedVersion)
  • Chalmers Publication Library (Chalmers University of Technology) (submittedVersion)
  • Chalmers Research (Chalmers University of Technology) (submittedVersion)
Funders
European Commission
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Stability and Control of Uncertain Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
Keywords
quantitative risk management, networked control systems, critical infrastructure, cyber-physical security, real-time control, distributed control, IT infrastructure

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