An Incentive-Compatible Energy Trading Framework for Neighborhood Area Networks With Shared Energy Storage
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Here, a novel energy trading system is proposed for demand-side management of a neighborhood area network (NAN) consisting of a shared energy storage (SES) provider, users with non-dispatchable energy generation, and an electricity retailer. In a leader-follower Stackelberg game, the SES provider first maximizes their revenue by setting a price signal and trading energy with the grid. Then, by following the SES provider's actions, the retailer minimizes social cost for the users, i.e., the sum of the total users' cost when they interact with the SES and the total cost for supplying grid energy to the users. A pricing strategy, which incorporates mechanism design, is proposed to make the system incentive-compatible by rewarding users who disclose true energy usage information. A unique Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved where the SES provider's revenue is maximized and the user-level social cost is minimized, which also rewards the retailer. A case study with realistic energy demand and generation data demonstrates 28-45% peak demand reduction of the NAN, depending on the number of participating users, compared to a system without SES. Simulation results confirm that the retailer can also benefit financially, in addition to the SES provider and the users.
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Cites
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
Energy Sharing Management for Microgrids With PV Prosumers: A Stackelberg Game Approach
Liu, N., Yu, X., Wang, C., & Wang, J. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2017.2654302 · Cited by 425 · cited 1×
“side management, with strategic user behavior [5], [13]–[18].”
Background
Cited by
The Utilization of Shared Energy Storage in Energy Systems: A Comprehensive Review
Dai, R., Esmaeilbeigi, R., & Charkhgard, H. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2021.3061619 · Cited by 344
Metadata
- Authors
- Mediwaththe, C. P., Shaw, M., Halgamuge, S., Smith, D. B., & Scott, P.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy
- Published
- 2020-01
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 467-476
- ISSN
- 1949-3029 (ISSN-L)
- 1949-3037
- OpenAlex
- W2912080816
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 5.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Mediwaththe, C. P., Shaw, M., Halgamuge, S., Smith, D. B., & Scott, P. (2020). An Incentive-Compatible Energy Trading Framework for Neighborhood Area Networks With Shared Energy Storage. IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy. https://doi.org/10.1109/tste.2019.2895387
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