Towards quantifying the cost of a secure IoT: Overhead and energy consumption of ECC signatures on an ARM-based device
Abstract
In this paper, we document the overhead in terms of runtime, firmware size, communication and energy consumption for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) signatures of modern ARM-based constrained devices. The experiments we have undertaken show that the cryptographic capabilities of the investigated Zolertia Re-Mote based on a TI's CC2538 chipset running Contiki OS is indeed suitable for the Internet-of-Things (IoT): Computing a signature using a curve with a 192-bit key length adds an additional runtime of roughly 200 ms. However, we found that in comparison to sending an unsigned message approximately two-thirds of the runtime overhead is spent on cryptographic operations, while sending the signed message accounts for the remainder. We give real measurements which can be used as a basis for analytical models. Our measurements show that the saving gained by using curves with lower security levels (i. e., 160-bit key length) is not worth the sacrifice in protection. While signatures add non-negligible overhead, we still think that the additional 200 ms (signing with secp192r) is worth consideration. This paper gives an indication of the true costs of cryptographically protected message integrity which is greater or equal to the cost of encryption. We show what needs to be spent in order to verify the origin of the data in the application, since in the IoT it will have travelled through many `things'.
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One of the main barriers for not implementing security mechanisms to protect communications is the low computing capabilities of most IoT nodes.
“Furthermore, one of the main barriers for not implementing security mechanisms to protect the communications is the low computing capabilities of most IoT nodes”
From A Practical Evaluation of a High-Security Energy-Efficient Gateway for IoT Fog Computing Applications (2017) · cites this paper as [26]
In WSN, low-power consumption requirements make difficult the implementation of complex and heavy operations required by ciphering algorithms to encrypt and secure communications.
“In the case of a Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), low-power consumption requirements make difficult the implementation of the complex and heavy operations required by ciphering algorithms to encrypt and secure communications [24,25,26,27].”
From A Practical Evaluation of a High-Security Energy-Efficient Gateway for IoT Fog Computing Applications (2017) · cites this paper as [26]
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Suárez-Albela, M., Fernández-Caramés, T., Fraga-Lamas, P., & Castedo, L. (2017) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s17091978 · Cited by 125 · see citing works
ECDSA on Things: IoT Integrity Protection in Practise
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Self-citation
- Authors
- Mossinger, M., Petschkuhn, B., Bauer, J., Staudemeyer, R. C., Wojcik, M., & Pohls, H. C.
- Affiliations
- University of Passau (DE)
- ORCID
- Staudemeyer, Ralf C.
- Venue
- 2016 IEEE 17th International Symposium on A World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2016-06
- Pages
- 1-6
- OpenAlex
- W2480162961
- Cited by
- 27
- References
- 18
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 3
- FWCI
- 3.13
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Keywords
- elliptic curve cryptography, digital signatures, Internet of Things security, energy consumption, runtime overhead, Contiki OS, message integrity, low-power sensor nodes
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