The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Leverage and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Unsuccessful Takeovers
Abstract
This paper finds that, on average, targets that terminate takeover offers significantly increase their leverage ratios. Targets that increase their leverage ratios the most reduce capital expenditures, sell assets, reduce employment, increase focus, and realize cash flows and share prices that outperform their benchmarks in the five years following the failed takeover. Our evidence suggests that leverage‐increasing targets act in the interests of shareholders when they terminate takeover offers and that higher leverage helps firms remain independent not because it entrenches managers, but because it commits managers to making the improvements that would be made by potential raiders.
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Citations
Cites
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
Ross, S. A. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003485 · Cited by 4,168
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia
Stein, J. C. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261524 · Cited by 1,673
Cited by
Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?
Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.387561 · Cited by 547
Earnings management and the market performance of acquiring firms
Louis, H. (2004) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.08.004 · Cited by 497
Can Managerial Discretion Explain Observed Leverage Ratios?
Morellec, E. (2004) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhg036 · Cited by 360
Metadata
- Authors
- Safieddine, A., & Titman, S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1999-04
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 547-580
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2158269427
- Cited by
- 210
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 27.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.