Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 169

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control

Open access
Burkart, Mike, Gromb, Denis, Panunzi, Fausto·2000·The Journal of Finance

Abstract

We analyze control transfers in firms with a dominant minority blockholder and otherwise dispersed owners, and show that the transaction mode is important. Negotiated block trades preserve a low level of ownership concentration, inducing more inefficient extraction of private benefits. In contrast, public acquisitions increase ownership concentration, resulting in fewer private benefits and higher firm value. Within our model, the incumbent and new controlling party prefer to trade the block because of the dispersed shareholders' free‐riding behavior. We also explore the regulatory implications of this agency problem and its impact on the terms of block trades.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/0022-1082.00222

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 169

Metadata

Authors
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2000-04
Volume
55
Issue
2
Pages
647-677
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W2121276764
Cited by
169
References
1
FWCI
28.64
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/0022-1082.00222
The paper
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F. (2000). Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00222

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.