The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control
Open accessAbstract
We analyze control transfers in firms with a dominant minority blockholder and otherwise dispersed owners, and show that the transaction mode is important. Negotiated block trades preserve a low level of ownership concentration, inducing more inefficient extraction of private benefits. In contrast, public acquisitions increase ownership concentration, resulting in fewer private benefits and higher firm value. Within our model, the incumbent and new controlling party prefer to trade the block because of the dispersed shareholders' free‐riding behavior. We also explore the regulatory implications of this agency problem and its impact on the terms of block trades.
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Cites
The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience
Zingales, L. (1994) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/7.1.125 · Cited by 970
Cited by
Founding‐Family Ownership, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Leverage
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/377115 · Cited by 695
Public Trading and Private Incentives:
Faure-Grimaud, A., & Gromb, D. (2004) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhh002 · Cited by 259
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Metadata
- Authors
- Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-04
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 647-677
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2121276764
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 28.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F. (2000). Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00222
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