The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience
Abstract
I study the large premium (82 percent) attributed to voting shares on the Milan Stock Exchange. The premium varies according to the ownership structure and the concentration of the voting rights, and it can be rationalized in the presence of enormous private benefits of control. A case study seems to indicate that in Italy private benefits of control can easily be worth more than 60 percent of the value of nonvoting equity. A tentative explanation for these findings is provided.
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Control is valued, and voting premiums increase as shareholder protection deteriorates.
“The evidence also shows directly that control is valued, and specifically that voting premiums increase as shareholder protection deteriorates (see, for example,Modigliani and Perotti 1998, Nenova 1999, and Zingales 1994).”
From Investor protection and corporate governance (2000) · cites this paper as Zingales 1994
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- Authors
- Zingales, L.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Zingales, Luigi
- ORCID
- Zingales, Luigi
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1994-01
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 125-148
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2136164601
- Cited by
- 970
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 27 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 30 · 2014: 33 · 2013: 37 · 2012: 54
- FWCI
- 83.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Review of Financial Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Financial Reporting and Valuation Research
- Keywords
- voting rights, private benefits of control, share premium, ownership structure, Milan Stock Exchange, corporate governance
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