The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Imperfect Competition among Informed Traders
Abstract
We analyze competition among informed traders in the continuous‐time Kyle(1985) model, as Foster and Viswanathan (1996) do in discrete time. We explicitly describe the unique linear equilibrium when signals are imperfectly correlated and confirm the conjecture of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) that there is no linear equilibrium when signals are perfectly correlated. One result is that at some date, and at all dates thereafter, the market would have been more informationally efficient had there been a monopolist informed trader instead of competing traders. The relatively large amount of private information remaining near the end of trading causes the market to approach complete illiquidity.
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Citations
Cites
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
Kyle, A. S. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913210 · Cited by 9,580
Long‐Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition
HOLDEN, C. W., & SUBRAHMANYAM, A. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03985.x · Cited by 801
Kallianpur, G. (1980) · Stochastic Modelling and Applied Probability · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-6592-2 · Cited by 755
Strategic Trading When Agents Forecast the Forecasts of Others
FOSTER, F. D., & VISWANATHAN, S. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04075.x · Cited by 505
Cited by
Lasry, J.-M., & Lions, P.-L. (2007) · Japanese Journal of Mathematics · doi:10.1007/s11537-007-0657-8 · Cited by 2,635
Corporate Social Responsibility and Credit Ratings
Attig, N., El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., & Suh, J. (2013) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-013-1714-2 · Cited by 783
The impact of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance
Cornett, M. M., Marcus, A. J., Saunders, A., & Tehranian, H. (2007) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.08.006 · Cited by 760
Greener Pastures and the Impact of Dynamic Institutional Preferences
Bennett, J. A., Sias, R. W., & Starks, L. T. (2003) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhg040 · Cited by 668
Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information: Bubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0198296983.001.0001 · Cited by 406
Metadata
- Authors
- Back, K., Cao, C. H., & Willard, G. A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-10
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 2117-2155
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2141826222
- Cited by
- 328
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 19.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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