The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Takeovers of Privately Held Targets, Methods of Payment, and Bidder Returns
Abstract
We examine bidder returns at the announcement of a takeover proposal when the target firm is privately held. In stock offers, bidders experience a positive abnormal return, which contrasts with the negative abnormal return typically found for bidders acquiring a publicly traded target. On the other hand, bidders experience no abnormal return in cash offers. Our analysis suggests that the positive wealth effect is related to monitoring activities by target shareholders and, to an extent, reduced information asymmetries.
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Citations
Cites
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
Brown, S. J., & Warner, J. B. (1985) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(85)90042-x · Cited by 6,488
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261354 · Cited by 6,236
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
MORCK, R., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05079.x · Cited by 1,887
Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firms' Stock Returns
TRAVLOS, N. G. (1987) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03921.x · Cited by 1,407
Equity issues and offering dilution
Asquith, P., & Mullins, D. W. (1986) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(86)90050-4 · Cited by 1,379
Cited by
Firm size and the gains from acquisitions
Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P., & Stulz, R. M. (2004) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.07.002 · Cited by 2,322
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
MASULIS, R. W., WANG, C., & XIE, F. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x · Cited by 1,772
What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions
Fuller, K., Netter, J., & Stegemoller, M. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00477 · Cited by 1,741
Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring‐Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave
MOELLER, S. B., SCHLINGEMANN, F. P., & STULZ, R. M. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00745.x · Cited by 1,417
The costs of intense board monitoring
Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 · Cited by 814
Metadata
- Authors
- Chang, S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1998-04
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 773-784
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2168970594
- Cited by
- 768
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 19.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Chang, S. (1998). Takeovers of Privately Held Targets, Methods of Payment, and Bidder Returns. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.315138
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.