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Tax Evasion and Moral Constraints: some Experimental Evidence
Abstract
SUMMARY: Tax evasion has been mainly studied as a problem of choice under uncertainty; like any portfolio manager, the taxpayer has to allocate her/his fixed gross income between two assets a risky asset, tax evasion, and a safe asset (with a zero return), tax payment. As suggested by the portfolio theory, the taxpayer's choice will be affected by her/his preferences — mainly by her/his attitude towards risk‐taking — and by the return on the risky asset determined by the tax structure, which includes both the tax rate and the penalties in the case of evasion However, the pure gamble model appears unsatisfactory on various grounds. Among these and most importantly for our purpose, it neglects the psychological aspects of the decision to evade tax because it rules out any feeling of shame about evading or being detected and punished, and it ignores any intrinsic pleasure from successful evasion In other words, the pure gamble model does not take full account of the moral constraints involved in the tax evasion decision. The main objective of the experiment presented here was therefore to investigate the role played by moral constraints in determining the decision to evade taxes. The experimental evidence supports the thesis that the taxpayer's decisional process involves not only monetary elements but also psychological and moral factors. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Die Steuerhinterziehung wurde bisher überwiegend als Problem von Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit untersucht Wie jeder Portfoliomanager muss auch der Steuerzahler sein Bruttoeinkommen zwischen zwei Anlageformen verteilen eine risikoreiche Anlageform. Steuerhinterziehung, und eine sichere Anlageform (ohne Gewinn), Steuerzahlung. Nach der Portfoliotheorie wird die Entscheidung des Steuerzahlers von seinen Praferenzen beeinflusst — vor allem von seiner Risiko‐bereitschaft — und von der Gewinnaussicht der risikoreichen Anlageform, die vom Steuersystem abhangt, d.h. vom Steuersatz und den Strafen bei Steuerhinterziehung. Dieses Lotteriemodell ist jedoch aus mehreren Grunden unbefriedigend: es vernachlässigt die psycholgischen Aspekte der Steuerhinterziehung, weil es jegliches Schamgefühl bei der Steuerhinterziehung bzw. der Entdeckung und Bestrafung ausschliesst und ein intrinsisches Vergnugen bei erfolgreicher Steuerhinterziehung ignoriert. Das Lotteriemodell zieht also nicht in Betracht, dass moralische Restriktionen die Entscheidung zur Steuerhinterziehung beeinflussen konnten Das hier vorgestellte Experiment wollte daher in erster Linie untersuchen, welche Rolle moralische Restriktionen bei der Entscheidung zur Steuerhinterziehung spielen. Die Ergebnisse des Experiments bestatigen die Hypothese, dass der Entscheidungsprozess des Steuerzahlers nicht nur durch monetare Elemente beeinflusst wird, sondern auch durch psychologische und moralische Faktoren. RÉSUMÉ: L'évasion fiscale a été principalement étudiée en tant qu'un problème de choix dans des conditions d'incertitude, comme n'importe quel gestionnaire de portfolio, le contribuable doit répartir son revenu brut fixe entre deux actifs un actif risqué, l'évasion fiscale, et un actif sǔr (avec un taux d'intérét zéro), le payement des taxes. Comme suggéré par la théorie du portfolio, le choix du contribuable sera affecté par ses préférences — principalement par son attitude vis‐à‐vis du risque — et par le bénéfice déterminé par la structure fiscale qui inclut à la fois le taux de taxation et les pénalités prévues en cas d'évasion Cependant, le modèle pur de jeu apparait insatisfaisant pour plusieurs rasisons Parmi celles‐ci, le modèle néglige les aspects psychologiques de la décision, limitation spécialement importante pour notre objectif, puisqu'il écarte tout sentiment de honte associé à la découverte de l'évasion et à la punition ou encore il ignore le plaisir découlant d'une évasion fiscale réussie. En résumé, le modèle pur de jeu ne prend pas pleinement en compte les contraintes morales qui influencent la décision. L'objectif principal de l'expérimentation présentée ici était d'analyser le rǒle joué par les contraintes morales dans la prise de décision d'évasion fiscale. Les résultats confirment l'hypothèse que le processus décisionel du contribuable dépend non seulement des aspects financiers mais également des facteurs psychologiques et moraux.
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Citations
Cites
Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2 · Cited by 4,970
Cited by
The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour
Kirchler, E., & Braithwaite, V. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511628238 · Cited by 1,206
Do Ethics Matter? Tax Compliance and Morality
Alm, J., & Torgler, B. (2011) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0761-9 · Cited by 607
Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments
Torgler, B. (2002) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00185 · Cited by 492
An analysis of norm processes in tax compliance
Wenzel, M. (2004) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0167-4870(02)00168-x · Cited by 457
WHAT MOTIVATES TAX COMPLIANCE?
Alm, J. (2019) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12272 · Cited by 442
Metadata
- Authors
- Bosco, L., & Mittone, L.
- Venue
- Kyklos
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1997-08
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 297-324
- ISSN
- 0023-5962 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6435
- OpenAlex
- W2000372414
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 2.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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