Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 561

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Auctions on the Internet: What’s Being Auctioned, and How?

Lucking‐Reiley, David·2000·The Journal of Industrial Economics

Abstract

This paper is an economist’s guide to auctions on the Internet. It traces the development of online auctions since 1993, and presents data from a comprehensive study of 142 different Internet auction sites. The results describe the transaction volumes, the types of auction mechanisms used, the types of goods auctioned, and the business models employed at the various sites. These new electronic‐commerce institutions raise interesting questions for the economic theory of auctions, such as predicting the types of goods to be sold at auction, examining the incentive effects of varying auctioneer fee structures, and identifying the optimal auction formats for online sellers.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/1467-6451.00122

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 561

Metadata

Authors
Lucking‐Reiley, D.
Venue
The Journal of Industrial Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2000-09
Volume
48
Issue
3
Pages
227-252
ISSN
  • 0022-1821 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-6451
OpenAlex
W2011516239
Cited by
561
References
0
FWCI
66.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Auctions on the Internet: What’s Being Auctioned, and How? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1467-6451.00122
The paper
Lucking‐Reiley, D. (2000). Auctions on the Internet: What’s Being Auctioned, and How? The Journal of Industrial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00122

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.