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Agents, Stakeholders and Corporate Governance in Russian Firms

Buck Filatotchev Wright, Trevor, Igor, Mike · 1998 · Journal of Management Studies
Cited by 83

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Abstract

This paper considers some developments within Russian privatized industrial firms 1992–94 through the lens of Stakeholder‐Agency Theory (SAT). Although it has its own shortcomings and weaknesses, SAT, unlike the traditional financial version of Agency Theory, at least contemplates the possibility of a transitional period during which enterprise governance structures can evolve. It is by now widely recognised that in the middle of deep economic crisis, the Russian economy is too volatile for longitudinal studies of formally structured samples of firms over a period of time. In any case, SAT is at a stage of development that has not yet yielded detailed predictions for scientific testing. Yet surveys of recently privatized firms in Russia do provide empirical data away from the origins of SAT, and it is argued that this fresh data suggests new research propositions that can hopefully lead to more theoretical refinement and ultimately testing. At the very least, SAT can be used as a heuristic device, capable of providing a way of looking at complex Russian developments in a structured way. A process of Russian privatization through management–employee buy‐outs involving giveaway distributions of shares has secured the compliance of the two main groups of enterprise stakeholders who could have prevented the withdrawal of the State from the governance of industrial enterprises, but has not yet produced a form of corporate governance structure that is likely to survive in the long term without State protection. In the longer term, international competitiveness can only be secured in Russia through investment in new products and processes, and the inadequacies of managers and other employees as sources of investable funds mean that incumbents must generate a more welcoming climate for outside investors. Even after such a short period since privatization and in the middle of a deep economic crisis, some enterprises are already favouring more efficient governance structures in a way consistent with SAT.

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Metadata

Authors
Buck Filatotchev Wright, T.
Venue
Journal of Management Studies
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1998-01
Volume
35
Issue
1
Pages
81-104
ISSN
  • 0022-2380 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-6486
OpenAlex
W2122334433
Cited by
83
References
0
FWCI
13.23
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Agents, Stakeholders and Corporate Governance in Russian Firms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1467-6486.00085
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Buck Filatotchev Wright, T. (1998). Agents, Stakeholders and Corporate Governance in Russian Firms. Journal of Management Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00085

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