The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Politicisation of the public service during democratic backsliding: Alternative perspectives
Open accessAbstract
This Research Note explores the issue of politicisation of the public service against the backdrop of the emergence of populism . A common feature of populist governments is a lack of trust in the civil service and its willingness to implement the populist political project. An important consequence of marginalising the civil service and its expertise in policy making is detrimental to policymaking. Also, increasing politicisation, that is replacing career public servants with people loyal to the populist regime, drains the public service of organisational memory on how to deal with policy issues. However, liberal democracies in many countries, too, have experienced increasing politicisation over the past decade, albeit within the confines of liberal democratic rules and norms. This emerging, more politicised model of the civil service assumes that neutrality can be an impediment to effective governance and that public servants should be committed to the program of the government. The civil service would be expected to support the government of the day actively and energetically, and therefore there would be fewer barriers. Thus, while politicisation in different forms is a feature of both liberal and populist government, the consequences of politicisation are different in the two regimes. Points for practitioners: In liberal democracies, the civil service offers expertise to support politicians in the policy‐making process. Populist governments, emphasizing loyalty to the regime more than expertise, tend to increase the number of political appointees in the public service. Most of the populist leaders elected are political outsiders and do not want to be constrained by what they consider to be entrenched and self‐serving elites. The most pressing dangers for liberal democracy are when populist governments consider policies that would change political and social rights. Liberal democratic government, too, have increased political control of the public service although without altering the rules and norms of democratic governance.
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Similar neoclientelist dynamics shape Bolsonaro's Brazil, Fujimori's Peru, and contemporary Serbia, where bureaucratic continuity conceals deep politicization and patronage-driven governance.
“but similar dynamics shape Bolsonaro's Brazil, Fujimori's Peru, and contemporary Serbia, where bureaucratic continuity conceals deep politicization and patronage- driven governance (Bauer and Becker2020; Peters and Pierre 2022; Menezes and Barbosa 2021; Peci2021; Radeljić and Đorđević2020)”
From Authoritarian Drift, Variegated Paths: Mapping Administrative Transformation Strategies Under Illiberal Rule (2025) · cites this paper as Peters and Pierre 2022
The introductory passage identifies Bolsonaro as a populist leader and says populist demands for compliance threaten bureaucratic autonomy in Brazil. Section 2, “The Alternative Model,” describes how populist leaders may politicise the civil service and appoint supporters. The paper does not establish the claimed dynamics in Fujimori’s Peru or contemporary Serbia, or say that bureaucratic continuity conceals neoclientelist, patronage-driven governance in those cases; page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredPopulists in government use politicization-often excessively-to 'cleanse' staff along ideological lines, offering patronage to favorites, and thus securing de facto control by putting trusted personnel in strategic positions.
“Populists also use politicization -often excessively -to”
From Public Administration Under Populist Rule: Standing Up Against Democratic Backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Peters & Pierre, 2022
The opening passage and §2 say populist leaders seek loyal appointees, replace career civil servants, and may sideline the existing civil service or appoint more supporters. These passages support the claim’s core account of politicisation, but do not establish that it is often excessive or specifically describe a patronage-based ideological ‘cleansing’ of staff into strategic positions. (LLM, conf=0.84)
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Citations
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Public Administration Under Populist Rule: Standing Up Against Democratic Backsliding
Bauer, M. W. (2024) · International Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/01900692.2023.2243400 · Cited by 104
“By “using” their state administrations, varying patterns of interaction can be expected, namely capture, dismantling, sabotage, or a form of incremental reform of the bureaucracy (Bauer & Becker, 2020; Bauer, Peters, & Pierre, 2021; Drezner, 2019).”
InfluentialThe Guardian State: Strengthening the public service against democratic backsliding
Yesilkagit, K., Bauer, M., Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (2024) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13808 · Cited by 112
Self-citationBauer, M. W. (2025) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.70028 · Cited by 19
Metadata
- Authors
- Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Pittsburgh (US)
- University of Gothenburg (SE)
- Corresponding author
- Pierre, Jon
- Venue
- Australian Journal of Public Administration
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2022-10-17
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 629-639
- ISSN
- 0313-6647 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8500
- OpenAlex
- W4306406792
- Cited by
- 80
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 17 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 11
- FWCI
- 24.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Australian Journal of Public Administration (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Funders
- University of Cambridge
- University of Oxford
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Public Administration and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Keywords
- civil service, democratic backsliding, populism, political appointees, policy expertise, institutional memory, liberal democracy
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