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Organizing Leviathan: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Making of Good Government
Abstract
Why are some countries less corrupt and better governed than others? Challenging conventional explanations on the remarkable differences in quality of government worldwide, this book argues that the organization of bureaucracy is an often overlooked but critical factor. Countries where merit-recruited employees occupy public bureaucracies perform better than those where public employees owe their post to political connections. The book provides a coherent theory of why, and ample evidence showing that meritocratic bureaucracies are conducive to lower levels of corruption, higher government effectiveness, and more flexibility to adopt modernizing reforms. Data comes from both a novel dataset on the bureaucratic structures of over 100 countries as well as from narratives of particular countries, with a special focus on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Spain and Sweden. A notable contribution to the literature in comparative politics and public policy on good governance, and to corruption studies more widely.
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Professional bureaucracy is oftentimes found positively associated both with the successful implementation of policy programs and with various social and economic outcomes.
“considering that a professional bureaucracy is oftentimes found positively associated both with the successful implementation of policy programs and with various social and economic outcomes (e.g. Dahlström and Lapuente 2017; Nistotskaya 2020).”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Dahlström and Lapuente 2017
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Suzuki, K., & Hur, H. (2019) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2019.1619813 · Cited by 102
“This is an aggregate measure, and this variable has been used in previous research (Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012a; Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialPoliticization, Bureaucratic Legalism, and Innovative Attitudes in the Public Sector
Lapuente, V., & Suzuki, K. (2020) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13175 · Cited by 137
Self-citationAn agenda for the study of Public Administration in Developing Countries
Bertelli, A., Hassan, M., Honig, D., Rogger, D., & Williams, M. J. (2020) · Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions · doi:10.1111/gove.12520 · Cited by 88
“Some of this new theory may in fact help scholars and practitioners alike to understand better the developed countries that they study most frequently (cf. Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017).”
BackgroundToral, G. (2023) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12758 · Cited by 133
“From a Weberian perspective, it is the insulation of bureaucrats from politicians that increases bureaucratic effectiveness (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).”
BackgroundCornell, A., Knutsen, C. H., & Teorell, J. (2020) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414020912262 · Cited by 95
“Whether having a Weberian bureaucratic organization promotes “good outcomes,” including good governance, are ultimately empirical questions (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017).”
BackgroundPoliticisation of the public service during democratic backsliding: Alternative perspectives
Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (2022) · Australian Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1111/1467-8500.12561 · Cited by 80
What does the evidence tell us about merit principles and government performance?
Oliveira, E., Abner, G., Lee, S., Suzuki, K., Hur, H., & Perry, J. (2023) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12945 · Cited by 76
Brezzi, M., González, S., Nguyen, D., & Prats, M. (2021) · OECD working papers on public governance · doi:10.1787/b6c5478c-en · Cited by 667
Charron, N., Lapuente, V., & Rodríguez‐Pose, A. (2022) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12529 · Cited by 106
“If civil servants are autonomous from their political superiors, they can speak truth to power, expressing their views based on their professional criteria, instead of trying to please their political bosses (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe link between quality of government and regional resilience in Europe
Ríos, V., & Gianmoena, L. (2020) · Journal of Policy Modeling · doi:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2020.02.005 · Cited by 64
Bureaucracy for the 21st Century: Clarifying and Expanding Our View of Bureaucratic OrganizationPreprint
Monteiro, P., & Adler, P. (2021) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4008916 · Cited by 64
“More recently, research has examined the importance of behavioral mechanisms, such as the development and maintenance of a sense of duty (du Gay & Pedersen, 2020), and the role of structural elements such as career systems (Dahlstr € om & Lapuente, 2017).”
Defining Bureaucratic Autonomy
Bersch, K., & Fukuyama, F. (2023) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102914 · Cited by 58
Political Competition and Public Procurement Outcomes
Broms, R., Dahlström, C., & Fazekas, M. (2019) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414019830723 · Cited by 52
“Such checks introduce a relatively efficient control mechanism on politicians (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Miller & Whitford, 2016).”
BackgroundSelf-citationSuzuki, K., & Demircioglu, M. (2018) · Public Performance & Management Review · doi:10.1080/15309576.2018.1519449 · Cited by 49
“Despite such recent scholarly interests in and reappraisals of bureaucracy (Dahlstr€om & Lapuente, 2017; Evans & Rauch, 1999; Miller, 2000; Olsen, 2006; Rauch & Evans, 2000; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008; Schuster, 2016; Sundell, 2014), the relationship between administrative characteristics and…”
BackgroundIs impartiality enough? Government impartiality and citizens' perceptions of public service quality
Suzuki, K., & Demircioğlu, M. A. (2020) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12527 · Cited by 65
“…bureaucratic structures and of the role played by bureaucracy in shaping public policies, their implementation, and the related socio-economic outcomes (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017, Evans and Rauch 1999, Fukuyama 2013, Miller 2000, Olsen 2006, 2008, Painter and Peters 2010, Rauch and Evans 2000).”
BackgroundAnalytical perspectives on varieties of clientelism
Yıldırım, K., & Kitschelt, H. (2020) · doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1641798 · Cited by 46
Politicization of the Bureaucracy across and within Administrative Traditions
Cooper, C. A. (2021) · International Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/01900692.2020.1739074 · Cited by 51
“…public servants according to merit has been tied to socioeconomic development (Evans & Rauch, 1999), organizational efficiency (Fuenzalida & Riccucci, 2018), expertise (Richardson, 2019), low levels of corruption (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017) and voicing frank and fearless advice (Cooper, 2018a).”
BackgroundEncouraging civil servants to be frank and fearless: Merit recruitment and employee voice
Cooper, C. A. (2018) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12548 · Cited by 50
Assessing the Multi-level Government Response to the COVID-19 Crisis: Italy and Spain Compared
Casula, M., & Pazos-Vidal, S. (2021) · doi:10.1080/01900692.2021.1915330 · Cited by 38
Innovative work behaviors and networking across government
Demircioğlu, M. A., Hameduddin, T., & Knox, C. (2021) · International Review of Administrative Sciences · doi:10.1177/00208523211017654 · Cited by 42
“…and management researchers should pay more attention to how different contexts (e.g. organizational or national) may influence outcomes such as performance or success of reforms (Dahlstr€om and Lapuente, 2017; Meier et al., 2017; O’Toole and Meier, 2015; Roberts, 2018; Suzuki and Hur, 2020).”
BackgroundThe Fiscal Economy of Good Government
Blanton, R. E., Fargher, L. F., Feinman, G. M., & Kowalewski, S. A. (2021) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/713286 · Cited by 41
Fleischer, J., & Reiners, N. (2021) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1093/isr/viaa097 · Cited by 73
Epistemic democracy and the quality of government
Rothstein, B. (2018) · European Politics and Society · doi:10.1080/23745118.2018.1515873 · Cited by 30
“Dahlström and Lapuente (2017) have recently made a strong case for the positive effects on controlling corruption through a meritocratically oriented civil service.”
BackgroundIs tax morale culturally driven?
Andriani, L., Bruno, R. L., Douarin, E., & Stępień-Baig, P. (2021) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137421000072 · Cited by 29
“Consistent evidence shows that bureaucracies recruiting civil servants on a merit-basis reduce the spread of corruption and other rent-seeking behaviour (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).”
Povitkina, M., & Bolkvadze, K. (2019) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12330 · Cited by 29
Goats or wolves? Private sector managers in the public sector
Lapuente, V., Suzuki, K., & de Walle, S. V. (2020) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12462 · Cited by 31
“While political science has long embraced cross-national comparison, the scholarly analysis of public administration and bureaucracy has a relatively modest history of comparative research (Dahlström, Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012; Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Suzuki & Hur, 2019).”
BackgroundSelf-citationFuture Challenges of Public Administration
Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2025) · Public Performance & Management Review · doi:10.1080/15309576.2025.2549297 · Cited by 29
How Inequality Affects Trust in Institutions: Evidence from Indonesia
Suryahadi, A., Izzati, R. A., Suryadarma, D., & Dartanto, T. (2022) · Asian Economic Policy Review · doi:10.1111/aepr.12401 · Cited by 24
Cronert, A. (2022) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x22000101 · Cited by 21
“…is an elusive concept (Bäck and Hadenius 2008), closely related to concepts such as quality of government (e.g. Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2016), government effectiveness (e.g. Dahlström and Lapuente 2017; Kaufmann et al. 2011), and bureaucratic quality (PRS Group 2019).”
BackgroundInfluentialPolitical change and administrative turnover in meritocratic systems
Askim, J., Bach, T., & Christensen, J. (2022) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402382.2022.2148195 · Cited by 22
“The archetypal meritocratic system separates political and administrative careers (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017), with a change of government or minister not resulting in a particularly high level of turnover among top civil servants.”
BackgroundPolitical Alignment and Bureaucratic Pay
Fiva, J. H., Geys, B., Heggedal, T.-R., & Sørensen, R. (2021) · Journal of public administration research and theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muaa053 · Cited by 22
Boucher, M., & Cooper, C. A. (2019) · Political Studies Review · doi:10.1177/1478929919847132 · Cited by 22
“In most countries with a professional Weberian bureaucracy, administrative personnel operate in a different realm of governing than politicians and partisan advisors (Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017).”
BackgroundUnderstanding evolving public motivational practices: An institutional analysis
Boruvka, E., & Perry, J. (2020) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12460 · Cited by 19
Fernández, S., & Cheema, F. S. (2024) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13896 · Cited by 25
“Contemporary scholars have offered various explanations for why bureaucratic autonomy is essential for governmental performance (Carpenter, 2001; Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Fukuyama, 2013; Huntington, 2006).”
InfluentialPoliticization, bureaucratic closedness in personnel policy, and turnover intention
Suzuki, K., & Hur, H. (2023) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12821 · Cited by 26
The Role of Monetary Incentives: Bonus and/or Stimulus
Ponta, L., Delfino, F., & Cainarca, G. (2020) · Administrative Sciences · doi:10.3390/admsci10010008 · Cited by 18
Imperial Rule, the Imposition of Bureaucratic Institutions, and Their Long-Term Legacies
Vogler, J. (2019) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s004388711900008x · Cited by 18
Suzuki, K. (2025) · Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/23276665.2025.2472611 · Cited by 17
“…around the world have found strong correlations between excessive politicisation and increased corruption, decreased organisational performance, and reduced operational efficiency (Cornell, 2014; Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Lapuente & Suzuki, 2020; Lewis, 2011; Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016).”
Encouraging bureaucrats to report corruption: human resource management and whistleblowing
Cooper, C. A. (2021) · Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/23276665.2021.1894955 · Cited by 17
“Replicating the work of Dahlström and Lapuente (2017), Figure 1 uses data from the Quality of Government Expert Survey (Dahlström et al., 2015) to compare the nature of bureaucracy in Australia with several Asia Pacific and Anglo-American countries according to two dimensions: bureaucratic…”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialToral, G. (2019) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3462459 · Cited by 17
“The fact that we observe robust cross-country correlations between governance outcomes and the separation of bureaucrats and politicians (Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017) does not necessarily imply that imposing such separations where they do not exist will be beneficial.”
BackgroundInfluentialMoriconi, M., & Cima, C. D. (2021) · International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics · doi:10.1080/19406940.2021.1928731 · Cited by 16
Populism and the rule of law: The importance of institutional legacies
Kyriacou, A. P., & Trivín, P. (2024) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12935 · Cited by 23
Garritzmann, J. L., & Siderius, K. (2024) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12859 · Cited by 13
Does bureaucratic performance vary across authoritarian regimes?
Knox, C., & Janenova, S. (2022) · Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/23276665.2022.2026794 · Cited by 15
“Separating the careers of politicians and bureaucrats is seen as vital in promoting government effectiveness and the prevention of corruption (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017).”
BackgroundPersonality Traits’ Predictors of Outstanding Performance in the Public Sector
Eshet, Y., & Harpaz, I. (2021) · Public Performance & Management Review · doi:10.1080/15309576.2021.1980064 · Cited by 15
State First? A Disaggregation and Empirical Interrogation
Andersen, D. R., & Doucette, J. (2020) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123420000083 · Cited by 15
“Bureaucratic quality is the rigorous and impartial service of public officials in policy advice and implementation (see Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).”
BackgroundCalibrating autonomy: How bureaucratic autonomy influences government quality in Brazil
Bersch, K., & Fukuyama, F. (2024) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12865 · Cited by 17
Which Jobs for Which Boys? Party Finance and the Politics of State Job Distribution in Africa
Sigman, R. (2021) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140211024291 · Cited by 28
“Jobs are therefore widely seen as a durable mechanism of political mobilization, even if their political use undermines state capacity (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Geddes, 1994).”
BackgroundIn Light of Democracy and Corruption: Institutional Determinants of Electricity Provision
Boräng, F., Jagers, S. C., & Povitkina, M. (2021) · Energy Journal · doi:10.5547/01956574.42.2.fbor · Cited by 14
“Appointments by, e.g., family ties are often associated with less competence and professionalism in the public sector (Lewis, 2007; Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017).”
BackgroundA stranger thing? Sweden as the upside down of multilevel trust
Erlingsson, G. Ó. (2021) · Journal of Trust Research · doi:10.1080/21515581.2021.2014337 · Cited by 14
“…mechanisms (checks-and-balances, auditing, transparency), as well as impartiality in public administration ’ s decision-making rule (e.g. Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Rothstein, 2021; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008) – surely must matter when gauging the quality of local…”
Samokhvalov, V., & Strelkov, A. (2020) · Journal of European Integration · doi:10.1080/07036337.2020.1807537 · Cited by 14
“Reform of the civil service code, however, remains crucial as without establishing a meritocratic and independent public administration system, the challenge of undermining democratic norms and practices through power abuse and graft remains high (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).”
BackgroundPublic servants, anonymity, and political activity online: bureaucratic neutrality in peril?
Cooper, C. A. (2018) · International Review of Administrative Sciences · doi:10.1177/0020852318780452 · Cited by 13
Between Merit and Patronage: Hybrid Appointments of Top Civil Service
Mamshae, A. (2025) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12914 · Cited by 14
Responding to Unethical Demands by One’s Leader: The Role of Public Service Motivation
Ripoll, G., & Schott, C. (2023) · International Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/01900692.2023.2233118 · Cited by 13
“First, most models of governance require a bureaucracy to effectively implement the decisions taken by the legislature (Dählstrom & Lapuente, 2017).”
Larsson, F., & Grimes, M. (2022) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00323217211067134 · Cited by 16
Populism and Political Appointments
Cohen, N., & Duhl, R. (2025) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.70023 · Cited by 15
“…before the rise of populism, as the quality of government largely depends on how well the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is organized, with systems that balance political control and bureaucratic professionalism leading to better governance outcomes (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).”
Cornell, A., & Grimes, M. (2022) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140221115171 · Cited by 12
Gomide, A. D. Á. (2021) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12572 · Cited by 13
Islands of Good Government: Explaining Successful Corruption Control in Two Spanish Cities
Drápalová, E., & Mascio, F. D. (2020) · doi:10.17645/pag.v8i2.2730 · Cited by 11
“…which engulfed three mayors (Majadahonda, Boadilla del Monte, and Pozuelo de Alarcón) and three former MPs of the regional parliament (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017), and the Púnica scandal that embroiled six mayors (among others Parla, Valdemoro, and Torrejón de Velasco) just within…”
BackgroundByrkjeflot, H. (2018) · Comparative Social Research · doi:10.1108/s0195-631020180000033006 · Cited by 11
Mayors and Corruption in Spain: Same Rules, Different Outcomes
Parrado, S., Dahlström, C., & Lapuente, V. (2018) · South European Society & Politics · doi:10.1080/13608746.2018.1528692 · Cited by 16
“On the contrary, it is in their mutual interest to turn a blind eye if they discover a corrupt action (Dahlström & Lapuente 2017).”
BackgroundSelf-citationBauhr, M., Charron, N., & Wängnerud, L. (2024) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-024-09925-x · Cited by 13
“In other words, elected politicians seek to monitor and influence the bureaucracy and hold bureau-cracies accountable (e.g., Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Raffler, 2022).”
Pierskalla, J. H. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009264839 · Cited by 10
Cornell, A., & Svensson, T. (2022) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12683 · Cited by 23
Sedlačko, M. (2020) · NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy · doi:10.2478/nispa-2020-0019 · Cited by 24
Huencho, V. F. (2020) · Critical Policy Studies · doi:10.1080/19460171.2020.1788615 · Cited by 10
“…Latin American States because its ‘apolitical and rational nature’ (Seibel 2010), highlighting the cases of Chile, Costa Rica, Argentina or Colombia (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017), because of the greater diversity in their societies this model become a limitation to move toward better recognition…”
BackgroundBack to Basics: A Comparative Analysis of Government Performance in Governing
Pierre, J., Peters, B., & Rönnerstrand, B. (2024) · International Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/01900692.2024.2339948 · Cited by 9
“Likewise, the greater use of outside appointments in government (see Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017) was assumed to bring a number of people into the administrative system that were not fully socialized into the traditional value structure of the public sector.”
Political parties and policy transfer in authoritarianism
Duong, H. (2022) · Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/23276665.2022.2045206 · Cited by 9
“The CPV’s monopoly over merit-based policy transfer illustrates that, in contrast to Western democracies, the separation of political and bureaucratic careers (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017) in authoritarian regimes is impossible.”
BackgroundHuencho, V. F., & Orellana, J. A. (2020) · International Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/01900692.2020.1773496 · Cited by 9
“Theory of representative bureaucracy: relevant factors for an active representation In Latin American case many states implemented Weberian models of organization and management, like Chile, Costa Rica, Argentina or Colombia (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Zuvanic et al., 2010).”
BackgroundPonta, L., Cainarca, G., & Cincotti, S. (2020) · Complex · doi:10.1155/2020/6152017 · Cited by 9
“Focusing on the relation between monetary incentives and employees’ performance, one of the most important theories is Performance Related Pay (PRP) theory, derived from the principles of Weberian bureaucracy, see [55], for further details.”
MethodDemmke, C. (2019) · Public Integrity · doi:10.1080/10999922.2019.1656960 · Cited by 9
“For example, writers like Dahlstr€om and Lapuente have challenged the classical assumption that traditional HR features are effective in the fight against corruption, patronage, and nepotism (Dahlstr€om & Lapuente, 2017).”
BackgroundBrieba, D., Herrera-Marín, M.-R., Riffo, M., & Garrido, D. (2024) · Latin American Politics and Society · doi:10.1017/lap.2023.41 · Cited by 8
“However, this lack of full civil service protections is not necessarily inimical to meritocracy and performance, and has arguably moved Chile from a closed Weberian model to a more open, managerial one (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).”
InfluentialTop Officials’ Careers and the Relationship Between Politics and Administration
Bach, T. (2020) · doi:10.2478/nispa-2020-0013 · Cited by 8
Niklasson, B., Christiansen, P., & Ohberg, P. (2019) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x18000508 · Cited by 8
“These countries can be classified as managerial bureaucracies (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017, 64).”
BackgroundIbañez, D., & Bello-Gómez, R. A. (2025) · Policy studies · doi:10.1080/01442872.2025.2580389 · Cited by 7
“Impartiality can be strengthened by insulating bureaucratic functions from direct political influence; for example, maintaining clear distinctions between political and administrative careers improves government outcomes (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).”
Cooper, C. A., & Reggie, J. (2025) · Public Administration Quarterly · doi:10.1177/07349149241310404 · Cited by 7
“This is because a primary reason for separating politics and administration is to uphold the public service’s impartiality (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017), and that political activity has been identified in some countries as potentially threatening the public service’s reputed impartiality (Cooper,…”
Geys, B., Murdoch, Z., & Sørensen, R. (2021) · Journal of public administration research and theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muab034 · Cited by 7
Andersen, D. D. E. (2021) · Social Science History · doi:10.1017/ssh.2021.15 · Cited by 13
Vogler, J. P. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3659764 · Cited by 10
“…impacts the administrative culture (Jamil and Dangal, 2009), the representation of social interests (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, 1981), and performance of administrative organizations, including corruption levels (Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017; Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell, 2012).”
BackgroundImplementation Is the Hardest Word: Explaining Georgia’s (Non)-Compliance with European Union Acquis
Anderlini, M. V. (2023) · Problems of Post-Communism · doi:10.1080/10758216.2023.2245546 · Cited by 6
“…type, modern bureaucratic organizations are composed of a series of distinct characteristics, one of which is a personnel system by which bureaucrats are recruited because of their skills and not of their ancestry or political connections (Sager and Rosser 2009, 1137; Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).”
When does bureaucracy function in autocratizing regimes? the court of auditors in Turkey
Soyaltın, D. (2022) · Turkish Studies · doi:10.1080/14683849.2022.2126767 · Cited by 10
Okorie, C. O., Ogba, F., Iwuala, H., Arua, C., Felix, N., & Nwosumba, V. C. (2022) · SAGE Open · doi:10.1177/21582440221089975 · Cited by 6
“Bureaucrats could significantly prevent corruption (Charron et al., 2017; Suzuki & Hur, 2020) improve service delivery (Fernández-Carro & Lapuente-Giné, 2016), and ensure organizational success (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017).”
BackgroundDemmke, C., Autioniemi, J., & Lenner, F. (2021) · Public Integrity · doi:10.1080/10999922.2021.1987056 · Cited by 6
A Set-Theoretical Analysis of the Pathway(s) to Digital Innovation in Developing Democracies
Morales, D. A. S. (2025) · Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis Research and Practice · doi:10.1080/13876988.2025.2566735 · Cited by 5
“One of the core traditional (Weberian) elements is a bureaucracy’s recruitment ethos in the public sector, whether it is based on merit and suitability for the position rather than political pressures (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).”
Dimensions of State Capacity and Modes of Democratic Breakdown
Andersen, D. D. E., Knutsen, C. H., & Skaaning, S. (2025) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00323217251344758 · Cited by 2
“…employment is the most important indicator of bureaucracy and administrative capacity more generally for influencing important outcomes like equal treatment of citizens and possibly economic development (Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017; but see Cornell et al., 2020; Dahlström and Lapuente, 2022).”
Bureaucratic Capacity and Political Favoritism in Public Procurement
Romero, D. (2024) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140241259448 · Cited by 5
“…’ careers (i.e., places where meritocratic recruitment and promotion is applied), the incidence of corruption tends to be lower, since capable personnel is largely shielded from political in fl uence (Bersch et al., 2017; Dahlstr¨om et al., 2012; Dahlstr¨om & Lapuente, 2017; Rauch & Evans, 2000).”
Are Autonomy and Intrinsic Motivation of Public Servants Lower in Post-Communist States?
Mussagulova, A., Chen, C., & Ritz, A. (2023) · Public Performance & Management Review · doi:10.1080/15309576.2023.2243246 · Cited by 7
“They argue that politicians and bureaucrats when completely divorced, have incentives to “ monitor each other ’ s behaviour in an embedded system of mutual checks and balances ” (Dahlstr € om & Lapuente, 2017, p. 30).”
BackgroundResultNadav, N., Benoliel, P. S., & Schechter, C. (2022) · British Educational Research Journal · doi:10.1002/berj.3848 · Cited by 6
Demmke, C., Autioniemi, J., & Lenner, F. (2021) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2021.2000221 · Cited by 5
“Findings suggest that more regulated, inflexible, and closed systems do not perform as well as more open, post-bureaucratic, and managerial systems (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017, 37, 38).”
InfluentialDahlström, C., & Holmgren, M. (2021) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/717756 · Cited by 4
Self-citationBello-Gómez, R. A. (2021) · Review of Public Personnel Administration · doi:10.1177/0734371x211030320 · Cited by 5
“Other studies reveal that compensation, career longevity, and stability (Bersch et al., 2017), and differentiated incentive structures for politicians and public officials (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017) are associated to reduced corruption.”
BackgroundThe Unexpected Actor? Civil‐Military Relations and Regulatory Agency Control in Brazil
Cunha, B. Q., López, F., & Çoban, M. K. (2025) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.70106 · Cited by 4
González, C., & Sanabria-Pulido, P. (2025) · Public Administration and Development · doi:10.1002/pad.70050 · Cited by 4
“Public administration systems in the region face persistent challenges linked to political patronage and clientelism (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017; Geddes 2023), which can undermine organizational outcomes (Wood and Lewis 2017; Gallo and Lewis 2012), though recent evidence suggests patronage may…”
Cho, B., & Choi, H. (2025) · Public Performance & Management Review · doi:10.1080/15309576.2025.2577701 · Cited by 4
“When there is a clear career separation due to meritocracy, however, public officials could speak out against politicians (Cooper, 2018; Cornell & Lapuente, 2014; Dahlström et al., 2012; Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017, 2022; Lapuente & Rothstein, 2014).”
InfluentialOslita, O., Febrian, F., & Ridwan, R. (2025) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.35308/jpp.v11i2.11708 · Cited by 4
“Dahlström & Lapuente (2017) extensive cross-national research on bureaucratic structures offers valuable theoretical grounding for understanding these structural conflicts.”
On Accountability and Hierarchy
Bendor, J., & Swistak, P. (2024) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055424000315 · Cited by 4
Luottamus vaakalaudalla – tarkastelussa ylimmän kuntajohdon kompleksiset kriisit
Kyösti, A., Paananen, H., Airaksinen, J., Haveri, A., & Lajunen, S. (2022) · Hallinnon Tutkimus · doi:10.37450/ht.113429 · Cited by 3
“…välisen roo lijaon ja painotusten vaihtelua ja institutio naa listen järjestelyjen jatkuvaa muutosta Komp lek sisessa ympäristössä duaalijohtamisen työnja koa koetellaan, ja eri osapuolten roolien ja tehtä vien erottaminen toisistaan on yhä vai keampaa (Dahlström & Lapuente 2017; Aberbach ym.”
BackgroundCareer Pressures and Organizational Evil: A Novel Perspective on the Study of Organized Violence
Scharpf, A., & Gläßel, C. (2022) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1093/isr/viac009 · Cited by 4
Quality of government in the Asia Pacific region
Lapuente, V., & Suzuki, K. (2022) · Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/23276665.2022.2062400 · Cited by 4
Self-citationLyu, H.-S., Kim, T. H., Sung, D., & Moon, M. (2022) · Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/23276665.2022.2028172 · Cited by 4
“Dahlström and Lapuente (2017) stress the positive impact of meritocratic bureaucracies in leading to low levels of corruption, government effectiveness, and reform orientation.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Dahlström, C., & Lapuente, V.
- Affiliations
- University of Gothenburg (SE)
- ORCID
- Dahlström, Carl
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2017-06-15
- OpenAlex
- W4248557076
- Cited by
- 210
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 30 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 13.81
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Public Administration and Governance
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
- Keywords
- meritocracy, political connections, corruption, government effectiveness, bureaucratic modernization, civil service recruitment, good governance, comparative bureaucracy, Spain, Sweden
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