Cited by 77Ethics and bioethics in healthcarePalliative Care and End-of-Life IssuesHealthcare Decision-Making and Restraints

The Concept of Precedent Autonomy

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Davies, John K.·2002·Bioethics

Abstract

Does respect for autonomy imply respect for precedent autonomy? The principle of respect for autonomy requires us to respect a competent patient’s treatment preference, but not everyone agrees that it requires us to respect preferences formed earlier by a now‐incapacitated patient, such as those expressed in an advance directive. The concept of precedent autonomy, which concerns just such preferences, is problematic because it is not clear that we can still attribute to a now‐incapacitated patient a preference which that patient never disaffirmed but can no longer understand. If we cannot make that attribution, then perhaps we should not respect precedent autonomy – after all, how can you respect patient autonomy by giving patients what they no longer want, even if they never disaffirmed those wants? I argue that whether an earlier preference can still be attributed to a now‐incapacitated patient depends on the reasons behind the preference, for a preference includes (and is not merely supported by) the reasons behind it. When the considerations that served as reasons no longer exist, neither does the preference which included those reasons. In particular, if the considerations that served as reasons for the patient exist only under conditions where the patient retains full mental capacity, then once that capacity is lost, so are those reasons and the preference based upon them. I use this analysis of precedent autonomy to ascertain the merits of various approaches to advance medical decisionmaking, including Nancy Rhoden’s approach, approaches based on a Parfitian personal identity analysis, approaches based on soft paternalism, and approaches based on the stability and longevity of preferences. Despite the apparent absurdity of respecting patient autonomy by giving patients what they no longer prefer but have never disaffirmed, I conclude with some programmatic remarks on when and why respect for (precedent) autonomy nonetheless requires us to respect former preferences.

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Crossref · 10.1111/1467-8519.00274

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  • A clinician's determination of a patient's lack of decision-making capacity based on physical or mental disorder has the same practical consequences as a legal determination of incompetence.

    “a clinician's determination of a patient's lack of decision-making capacity based on physical or mental disorder has the same practical consequences as a legal determination of incompetence [11].”

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Authors
Davies, J. K.
Venue
Bioethics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2002-04
Volume
16
Issue
2
Pages
114-133
ISSN
  • 0269-9702 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-8519
OpenAlex
W2108047478
Cited by
77
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 10 · 2018: 6 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 2
FWCI
5.25
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Bioethics (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
  • DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Ethics and bioethics in healthcare
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Palliative Care and End-of-Life Issues
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Clinical Psychology › Healthcare Decision-Making and Restraints
Keywords
patient autonomy, advance directives, incapacitated patients, personal identity, soft paternalism, treatment preferences
MeSH terms
Decision Making, Dementia, Humans, Unconsciousness, Advance Directives, Mental Competency, Advance Directive Adherence, Personal Autonomy, Paternalism, Personhood

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