Molarity Versus Modularity of Cognitive Functioning?: A Behavioral Genetic Perspective
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
What is it that allows people to describe the meaning of a word, solve an analogy, complete a logic puzzle, or recall memories? His torically, cognitive and neuropsy chological researchers have sought to delineate the normative, species invariant dimensions of cognitive functioning that enable people to solve these diverse cognitive prob lems. Describing the relationship and developmental course of these processes has been a major theoret ical focus of the cognitive litera ture. Are cognitive processes re lated, or are they distinct from one another? How do they develop? These issues are addressed by the continuing molarity-versus modularity debate. A molar system is one in which a unitary, general process functions across a wide va riety of cognitive tasks. A modular system involves numerous distinct cognitive processing units, each re sponsible for certain nonoverlap ping cognitive tasks. Currently, modularity is the dominant theory in developmental cognitive psychology and neuro science (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). According to this theory, cognitive processes are molar at birth and differentiate into distinct modular units as development proceeds. I Typically, evidence for modularity is demonstrated by showing that functioning in one domain is unaf fected by damage in another do main. For example, William's syn drome, an extremely rare genetic disorder (1 in 25,000 births), results in decreased spatial functioning but leaves verbal abilities unaf fected, and in some cases, enhanced. Environmental damage (e.g., from prenatal trauma, head injury, and strokes) has also been shown to se lectively damage certain cognitive processes, but not others. These studies demonstrate
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Citations
Cites
Human Cognitive Abilities: A Survey of Factor-Analytic Studies
Carroll, J. B. (1993) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511571312 · Cited by 4,121
Growing up and growing apart: a developmental meta-analysis of twin studies.
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Cited by
Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2017) · Cortex · doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2016.04.023 · Cited by 1,834
Individual differences in executive functions are almost entirely genetic in origin.
Friedman, N. P., Miyake, A., Young, S. E., DeFries, J. C., Corley, R. P., & Hewitt, J. K. (2008) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.137.2.201 · Cited by 1,547
Top 10 Replicated Findings From Behavioral Genetics
Plomin, R., DeFries, J. C., Knopik, V. S., & Neiderhiser, J. M. (2016) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691615617439 · Cited by 517
“One implication of this finding is that the phenotypic structure of domains is similar to their genetic structure, as has been shown, for example, for cognitive abilities (Petrill, 1997) and personality (Turkheimer et al., 2014).”
Intelligence: Genetics, Genes, and Genomics.
Plomin, R., & Spinath, F. M. (2004) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.1.112 · Cited by 418
Differentiation of cognitive abilities across the life span.
Tucker-Drob, E. M. (2009) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0015864 · Cited by 327
Metadata
- Authors
- Petrill, S. A.
- Venue
- Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1997-08
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 96-99
- ISSN
- 0963-7214 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8721
- OpenAlex
- W2170963087
- Cited by
- 58
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 3.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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