The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission
Abstract
We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. This suggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory. For instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative source of knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speaker to another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another. These considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesis regarding the transmission of testimonial knowledge. The stronger thesis is that each speaker in a chain of testimonial transmission must know that p in order to pass this knowledge to a hearer. The weaker thesis is that at least the first speaker must know that p in order for any hearer in the chain to come to know that p via testimony. I argue that both theses are false, and hence testimony, unlike memory, can be a generative source of knowledge.
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Cites
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Williamson, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
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Self-citationWhy we don’t deserve credit for everything we know
Lackey, J. (2007) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9044-x · Cited by 388
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lackey, J.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1999-10
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 197
- Pages
- 471-490
- ISSN
- 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9213
- OpenAlex
- W2171734057
- Cited by
- 414
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 67.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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