The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics Perspective
Abstract
Conventional analysis of government typically focuses on ‘politics’, that is, interests, conflicts or personalities. But governing a country is not only a task of successfully governing its people but also an administrative task of managing subordinate officials. This is a very relevant issue in a country such as China, with a massive bureaucracy. The top ‘managers’ of the country – some 30 national leaders – make policies but also manage a large number of bureaucratic personnel. As in business organizations, control problems occur when subordinates have different interests from those of the organization and when the behavior of subordinates is imperfectly monitored. Control mechanisms are designed to minimize such problems by either aligning interests or improving information. This article uses this framework to explain a wide variety of administrative phenomena in Chinese government organizations.
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Citations
Cites
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
The New Economics of Organization
Moe, T. M. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110997 · Cited by 1,974
An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm
Hart, O. (1989) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1122818 · Cited by 498 · cited 1×
“It is well known that incomplete contracts give rise to shirking and in order to deter shirking (see Hart 1989), organizations rely on implicit control when direct monitoring is costly.”
Background
Cited by
Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the Reform Era
Pye, L. W., Huang, Y., & Wedeman, A. H. (2004) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20033878 · Cited by 675
Self-citationDecentralization and political institutions
Enikolopov, R., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2007) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.02.006 · Cited by 502
Jiang, J. (2018) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12394 · Cited by 413
Eaton, S., & Kostka, G. (2014) · The China Quarterly · doi:10.1017/s0305741014000356 · Cited by 381
Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China
Chen, X. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139053310 · Cited by 294
Metadata
- Authors
- Huang, Y.
- Venue
- Political Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2002-03
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 61-79
- ISSN
- 0032-3217 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9248
- OpenAlex
- W2040751254
- Cited by
- 205
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 30.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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