The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Partition Priming in Judgment Under Uncertainty
Abstract
We show that likelihood judgments are biased toward an ignorance-prior probability that assigns equal credence to each mutually exclusive event considered by the judge. The value of the ignorance prior depends crucially on how the set of possibilities (i.e., the state space) is subjectively partitioned by the judge. For instance, asking “what is the probability that Sunday will be hotter than any other day next week?” facilitates a two-fold case partition, (Sunday hotter, Sunday not hotter), thus priming an ignorance prior of 1/2. In contrast, asking “what is the probability that the hottest day of the week will be Sunday?” facilitates a seven-fold class partition, (Sunday hottest, Monday hottest, etc.), priming an ignorance prior of 1/7. In four studies, we observed systematic partition dependence: Judgments made by participants presented with either case or class formulations of the same query were biased toward the corresponding ignorance prior.
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Self-citationZhang, H., & Maloney, L. T. (2012) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2012.00001 · Cited by 679
Moore, D. A., & Cain, D. M. (2007) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.09.002 · Cited by 343
Fox, C. R., & Clemen, R. T. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1050.0409 · Cited by 255
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fox, C. R., & Rottenstreich, Y.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2003-05
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 195-200
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2106307464
- Cited by
- 240
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 6.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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