The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of lobbying on political competition and policy outcomes in a framework which integrates the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with the menu-auction model of lobbying. Positive and normative issues are analysed. On the positive side, lobbying need have little or no effect on policy outcomes because voters can restrict the influence of lobbyists by supporting candidates with offsetting policy preferences. On the normative side, coordination failure among lobbyists can result in Pareto inefficient policy choices. In addition, by creating rents to holding office, lobbying can lead to “excessive” entry into electoral competition.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India
Chattopadhyay, R., & Duflo, E. (2004) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00539.x · Cited by 2,284
Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603770383424 · Cited by 445
Self-citationGrose, C. R., Lopez, P., Sadhwani, S., & Yoshinaka, A. (2022) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/714923 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Besley, T., & Coate, S.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2001-01-01
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 67-82
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2143376017
- Cited by
- 229
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 40.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1467-937x.00160
- The paper
- Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2001). Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00160
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
