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Cited by 445

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence

Besley, Timothy, Coate, Stephen·2003·Journal of the European Economic Association
DOI 10.1162/154247603770383424
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Abstract

This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Because voters have only one vote to cast and regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, there are electoral incentives to respond to stakeholder interests. If regulators are elected, their stance on regulation is the only salient issue so that the electoral incentive is to run a pro-consumer candidate. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from U.S. states, we find new evidence in favor of the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies.

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Metadata

Authors
Besley, T., & Coate, S.
Venue
Journal of the European Economic Association
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2003-09-01
Volume
1
Issue
5
Pages
1176-1206
ISSN
  • 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
  • 1542-4774
DOI
10.1162/154247603770383424
OpenAlex
W3022212517
Cited by
445
References
12
FWCI
73.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/154247603770383424
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Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003). Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603770383424

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.