The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
Abstract
This paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness. I show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group. But, group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare. Not publishing individuals’ votes, raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare. If the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers, the incentive to build a reputation is greater, but expected social welfare may be higher or lower.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-x · Cited by 3,610
Schweiger, D. M., Sandberg, W. R., & Ragan, J. W. (1986) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/255859 · Cited by 682
Cited by
Social Value of Public Information
Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024610 · Cited by 1,967
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002606 · Cited by 904
Communication by Central Bank Committee Members: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness?
EHRMANN, M., & FRATZSCHER, M. (2007) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.1111/j.0022-2879.2007.00034.x · Cited by 370
Metadata
- Authors
- Sibert, A.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-07
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 649-665
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W3122448459
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 37.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1467-937x.00260
- The paper
- Sibert, A. (2003). Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations. Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00260
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.