The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Communication by Central Bank Committee Members: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness?
Abstract
The paper assesses the communication strategies of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the European Central Bank and their effectiveness. We find that the effectiveness of communication is not independent from the decision‐making process. The paper shows that the Federal Reserve has been pursuing a highly individualistic communication strategy amid a collegial approach to decision making, while the Bank of England is using a collegial communication strategy and highly individualistic decision making. The European Central Bank (ECB) has chosen a collegial approach both in its communication and in its decision making. Assessing these strategies, we find that predictability of policy decisions and the responsiveness of financial markets to communication are equally good for the Federal Reserve and the ECB. This suggests that there may not be a single best approach to designing a central bank communication strategy.
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Cites
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Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322655392 · Cited by 5,377
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Parker, E. B., & Holsti, O. R. (1970) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2093233 · Cited by 4,564
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-x · Cited by 3,610
Social Value of Public Information
Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024610 · Cited by 1,967
Gürkaynak, R. S., Sack, B., & Swanson, E. T. (2004) · Finance and Economics Discussion Series · doi:10.17016/feds.2004.66 · Cited by 1,560
The Present-Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied Variance Bounds
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Cukierman, A., & Meltzer, A. H. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912324 · Cited by 1,286
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Cited by
Can ChatGPT Decipher Fedspeak?
Hansen, A. L., & Kazinnik, S. (2023) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4399406 · Cited by 76
Central banking and inequalities: Taking off the blinders
Fontan, C., Claveau, F., & Dietsch, P. (2016) · Politics, Philosophy & Economics · doi:10.1177/1470594x16651056 · Cited by 62
Metadata
- Authors
- EHRMANN, M., & FRATZSCHER, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-03
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 509-541
- ISSN
- 0022-2879 (ISSN-L)
- 1538-4616
- OpenAlex
- W1979659196
- Cited by
- 370
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 48.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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