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Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief
Abstract
Abstract: Circumscribed delusional beliefs can follow brain injury. We suggest that these involve anomalous perceptual experiences created by a deficit to the person's perceptual system, and misinterpretation of these experiences due to biased reasoning. We use the Capgras delusion (the claim that one or more of one's close relatives has been replaced by an exact replica or impostor) to illustrate this argument. Our account maintains that people voicing this delusion suffer an impairment that leads to faces being perceived as drained of their normal affective significance, and an additional reasoning bias that leads them to put greater weight on forming beliefs that are observationally adequate rather than beliefs that are a conservative extension of their existing stock. We show how this position can integrate issues involved in the philosophy and psychology of belief, and examine the scope for mutually beneficial interaction.
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Cites
Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.35.2.151 · Cited by 8,094
From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure
Shallice, T. (1988) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511526817 · Cited by 4,072
Cited by
McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09990975 · Cited by 474
Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account
Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & Breen, N. (2001) · Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology · doi:10.1353/ppp.2001.0007 · Cited by 383
The 33rd Sir Frederick Bartlett Lecture Cognitive neuropsychiatry and delusional belief
Coltheart, M. (2007) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17470210701338071 · Cited by 280
Cognitive neuropsychiatry: towards a scientific psychopathology
Halligan, P. W., & David, A. S. (2001) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/35058586 · Cited by 158
Models of misbelief: integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions
McKay, R., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2007) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.01.003 · Cited by 66
Metadata
- Authors
- Stone, T., & Young, A. W.
- Venue
- Mind and Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1997-09
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 3&4
- Pages
- 327-364
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W2072938940
- Cited by
- 219
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 3.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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