Normativity and Rationality in Delusional Psychiatric Disorders
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality (procedural and epistemic)and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders.
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Citations
Cites
Cognitive approaches to delusions: a critical review of theories and evidence.
Garety, P. A., & Freeman, D. (1999) · British Journal of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1348/014466599162700 · Cited by 794 · cited 2×
“In a recent survey article Garety and Freeman point to the importance of evaluating reasoning relative to Bayesian norms, rather than in terms of the ability to grasp and manipulate the formal principles of deductive logic ( Garety and Freeman 1999 ).”
BackgroundProbabilistic judgements in deluded and non-deluded subjects
Huq, S. F., Garety, P. A., & Hemsley, D. R. (1988) · The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A · doi:10.1080/14640748808402300 · Cited by 596
Cited by
Stanovich, K. E. (2009) · In two minds: Dual processes and beyond · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230167.003.0003 · Cited by 514
Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & McKay, R. (2011) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131622 · Cited by 262
Stanovich, K. E. (2012) · The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0022 · Cited by 169
Bell, V., Raihani, N., & Wilkinson, S. (2021) · Clinical Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/2167702620951553 · Cited by 78
“…procedural rationality (i.e., inconsistency with clearly relevant and available preexisting beliefs and mental states given the application of reliable forms of inference; Bermúdez, 2001), implies problems with the cognitive processes underlying the capacity to reason pragmatically (Gerrans, 2001).”
BackgroundStanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2011) · The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511977244.040 · Cited by 77
Metadata
- Authors
- Bermúdez, J. L.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001-11
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 493-457
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W2046443204
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 2.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Bermúdez, J. L. (2001). Normativity and Rationality in Delusional Psychiatric Disorders. Mind & Language. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00179
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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