CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 169Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsCognitive Abilities and TestingCognitive Science and Education Research

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

On the Distinction Between Rationality and Intelligence: Implications for Understanding Individual Differences in Reasoning

Stanovich, Keith E.·2012·The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning
DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0022
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

Abstract A concern for individual differences has been missing from the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science—the debate about how much irrationality to attribute to human cognition. There are individual differences in rational thinking that are less than perfectly correlated with individual differences in intelligence because intelligence and rationality occupy different conceptual locations in models of cognition. A tripartite extension of currently popular dual-process theories is presented in this chapter that illustrates how intelligence and rationality are theoretically separate concepts. The chapter concludes by showing how this tripartite model of mind, taken in the context of studies of individual differences, can help to resolve the Great Rationality Debate.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0022

Cites

33 of 33 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 33 references

Research works printed but not linked: 200

  1. Ackerman, P. L. (1994). Intelligence, attention, and learning: Maximal and typical performance. In D. K. Detterman (Ed.), Current topics in human intelligence (Vol. 4, pp. 1–27). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
  2. Ackerman,, 1996, A theory of adult development: Process, personality, interests, and knowledge., Intelligence, 10.1016/S0160-2896(96)90016-1 · DOI · Paper page
  3. Ackerman, P. L., & Kanfer, R. (2004). Cognitive, affective, and conative aspects of adult intellect within a typical and maximal performance framework. In D. Y. Dai & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Motivation, emotion, and cognition: Integrative perspectives on intellectual functioning and development (119–141). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
  4. Ainslie,, 1982, A behavioral economic approach to the defence mechanisms: Freud's energy theory revisited., Social Science Information, 10.1177/053901882021006001 · DOI
  5. Ainslie,, 2001, Breakdown of will, 10.1017/CBO9781139164191 · DOI
  6. Anderson,, 1990, The adaptive character of thought
  7. Anderson, M. (2005). Marrying intelligence and cognition: A developmental view. In R. J. Sternberg & J. E. Pretz 450(Eds.), Cognition and intelligence (pp. 268–287). New York: Cambridge University Press.
  8. Arkes,, 1999, The sunk cost and Concorde effects: Are humans less rational than lower animals?, Psychological Bulletin, 10.1037/0033-2909.125.5.591 · DOI · Paper page
  9. Aron,, 2008, Progress in executive-function research: From tasks to functions to regions to networks., Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2008.00561.x · DOI
  10. Audi,, 1993, The structure of justification
  11. Audi,, 2001, The architecture of reason: The structure and substance of rationality
  12. Aunger,, 2008, Kinds of behaviour., Biology and Philosophy, 10.1007/s10539-007-9108-4 · DOI
  13. Austin, E. J., & Deary, I. J. (2002). Personality dispositions. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Why smart people can be so stupid (pp. 187–211). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  14. Baron, J. (1982). Personality and intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of human intelligence (pp. 308–351). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
  15. Baron,, 2008, Thinking and deciding
  16. Barrett,, 2006, Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate., Psychological Review, 10.1037/0033-295X.113.3.628 · DOI
  17. Bates,, 2003, Crystallized intelligence as a product of speed and drive for experience: the relationship of inspection time and openness to g and Gc., Intelligence, 10.1016/S0160-2896(02)00176-9 · DOI
  18. Bazerman,, 2008, Judgment in managerial decision making
  19. Bermudez,, 2001, Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders., Mind and Language, 10.1111/1468-0017.00179 · DOI
  20. Best,, 2009, Executive functions after age 5: Changes and correlates., Developmental Review, 10.1016/j.dr.2009.05.002 · DOI · Paper page
  21. Bickerton,, 1995, Language and human behavior
  22. Bishop,, 2005, Epistemology and the psychology of human judgment, 10.1093/0195162293.001.0001 · DOI
  23. Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (2001). Fuzzy-trace theory: Dual processes in memory, reasoning, and cognitive neuroscience. In H. W. Reese & R. Kail (Eds.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 28, pp. 41–100). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
  24. Camerer,, 2005, Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics., Journal of Economic Literature, 10.1257/0022051053737843 · DOI
  25. Carruthers,, 2006, The architecture of the mind, 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207077.001.0001 · DOI
  26. Cattell,, 1963, Theory for fluid and crystallized intelligence: A critical experiment., Journal of Educational Psychology, 10.1037/h0046743 · DOI
  27. Cattell, R. B. (1998). Where is intelligence? Some answers from the triadic theory. In J. J. McArdle & R. W. Woodcock (Eds.), Human cognitive abilities in theory and practice (29–38). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
  28. Chaiken, S., Liberman, A., & Eagly, A. H. (1989). Heuristic and systematic information within and beyond the persuasion context. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 212–252). New York: Guilford Press.
  29. Cohen,, 1981, Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10.1017/S0140525X00009092 · DOI
  30. Cohen,, 1982, Are people programmed to commit fallacies? Further thoughts about the interpretation of experimental data on probability judgment., Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 10.1111/j.1468-5914.1982.tb00450.x · DOI
  31. Cohen,, 1986, The dialogue of reason
  32. Cokely,, 2009, Cognitive abilities and superior decision making under risk: A protocol analysis and process model evaluation., Judgment and Decision Making, 10.1017/S193029750000067X · DOI · Paper page
  33. Coltheart,, 1999, Modularity and cognition., Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01289-9 · DOI
  34. Cosmides,, 1996, Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty., Cognition, 10.1016/0010-0277(95)00664-8 · DOI · Paper page
  35. Cronbach,, 1949, Essentials of psychological testing
  36. Davies,, 2000, Interaction without reduction: The relationship between personal and sub-personal levels of description., Mind and Society, 10.1007/BF02512315 · DOI
  37. Dawes, R. M. (1998). Behavioral decision making and judgment. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 497–548). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.
  38. Dawkins,, 1982, The extended phenotype
  39. Del, 2010, Executive functions in decision making: An individual differences approach., Thinking and Reasoning
  40. Dennett,, 1987, The intentional stance
  41. Dennett,, 1988, Precis of “The Intentional Stance”., Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10.1017/S0140525X00058611 · DOI
  42. Dennett,, 1995, Darwin's dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings of life
  43. Dennett,, 1996, Kinds of minds: Toward an understanding of consciousness
  44. de, 2007, Why think? Evolution and the rational mind
  45. Doherty, M. (2003). Optimists, pessimists, and realists. In S. L. Schneider & J. Shanteau (Eds.), Emerging perspectives on judgment and decision research (pp. 643–679). New York: Cambridge University Press.451 · DOI
  46. Dohmen,, 2009, Biased probability judgment: Evidence of incidence and relationship to economic outcomes from a representative sample., Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.014 · DOI
  47. Duncan,, 2008, Goal neglect and Spearman's g: Competing parts of a complex task., Journal of Experimental Psychology-General
  48. Edwards,, 1954, The theory of decision making., Psychological Bulletin, 10.1037/h0053870 · DOI
  49. Edwards, W., & von Winterfeldt, D. (1986). On cognitive illusions and their implications. In H. R. Arkes & K. R. Hammond (Eds.), Judgment and decision making (pp. 642–679). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
  50. Engle,, 2002, Working memory capacity as executive attention., Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10.1111/1467-8721.00160 · DOI · Paper page
  51. Evans,, 1984, Heuristic and analytic processes in reasoning., British Journal of Psychology, 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1984.tb01915.x · DOI
  52. Evans,, 1989, Bias in human reasoning: Causes and consequences
  53. Evans,, 2003, In two minds: Dual-process accounts of reasoning., Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012 · DOI
  54. Evans,, 2006, The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation., Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 10.3758/BF03193858 · DOI
  55. Evans,, 2007, Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgment, 10.4324/9780203947487 · DOI
  56. Evans, J. St. B. T. (2009). How many dual-process theories do we need? One, two, or many? In J. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds: Dual processes and beyond (pp. 33–54). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
  57. Evans,, 2010, Thinking twice: Two minds in one brain
  58. Evans,, 2009, In two minds: Dual processes and beyond, 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230167.001.0001 · DOI
  59. Evans,, 1993, Human reasoning: The psychology of deduction
  60. Evans,, 1996, Rationality and reasoning
  61. Evans,, 2010, Heuristic thinking and human intelligence: A commentary on Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer., Cognitive Processing, 10.1007/s10339-009-0339-y · DOI
  62. Evans,, 1976, Rationalization in a reasoning task., British Journal of Psychology, 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1976.tb01536.x · DOI
  63. Eysenck, H. J. (1994). Personality and intelligence: Psychometric and experimental approaches. In R. J. Sternberg & P. Ruzgis (Eds.), Personality and intelligence (pp. 3–31). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
  64. Foley,, 1987, The theory of epistemic rationality, 10.4159/harvard.9780674334236 · DOI
  65. Frank,, 2009, Multiple systems in decision making., Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01612.x · DOI
  66. Frankish,, 2004, Mind and supermind, 10.1017/CBO9780511487507 · DOI
  67. Frankish, K. (2009). Systems and levels: Dual-system theories and the personal-subpersonal distinction. In J. S. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds: Dual processes and beyond (pp. 89–107). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
  68. Frederick,, 2005, Cognitive reflection and decision making., Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10.1257/089533005775196732 · DOI · Paper page
  69. Gawronski,, 2006, Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change., Psychological Bulletin, 10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692 · DOI
  70. Gigerenzer,, 1996, On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky (1996)., Psychological Review, 10.1037/0033-295X.103.3.592 · DOI
  71. Gigerenzer,, 2002, Calculated risks: How to know when numbers deceive you
  72. Gigerenzer,, 2007, Gut feelings: The intelligence of the unconscious
  73. Gilbert,, 2006, Stumbling on happiness
  74. Gilboa,, 2010, Rational choice
  75. Gilovich,, 2002, Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment, 10.1017/CBO9780511808098 · DOI
  76. Goff,, 1992, Personality-intelligence relations: Assessment of typical intellectual engagement., Journal of Educational Psychology, 10.1037/0022-0663.84.4.537 · DOI
  77. Harman, G. (1995). Rationality. In E. E. Smith & D. N. Osherson (Eds.), Thinking (Vol. 3, pp. 175–211). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
  78. Hasher, L., Lustig, C., & Zacks, R. (2007). Inhibitory mechanisms and the control of attention. In A. Conway, C. Jarrold, M. Kane, A. Miyake, & J. Towse (Eds.), Variation in working memory (pp. 227–249). New York: Oxford University Press.
  79. Hastie,, 2010, Rational choice in an uncertain world
  80. Hilton, D. J. (2003). Psychology and the financial markets: Applications to understanding and remedying irrational decision-making. In I. Brocas & J. D. Carrillo (Eds.), The psychology of economic decisions. Vol. 1: Rationality and well-being (pp. 273–297). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
  81. Horn,, 1967, Age differences in fluid and crystallized intelligence., Acta Psychologica, 10.1016/0001-6918(67)90011-X · DOI · Paper page
  82. Horn, J. L., & Noll, J. (1997). Human cognitive capabilities: Gf-Gc theory. In D. Flanagan, J. Genshaft, & P. Harrison (Eds.), Contemporary intellectual assessment: Theories, tests, and issues (pp. 53–91). New York: Guilford Press.452
  83. Hsee,, 2006, Decision and experience: Why don't we choose what makes us happy?, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10.1016/j.tics.2005.11.007 · DOI
  84. Hurley, S., & Nudds, M. (2006). The questions of animal rationality: Theory and evidence. In S. Hurley & M. Nudds (Eds.), Rational animals? (pp. 1–83). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. · DOI
  85. Jeffrey,, 1983, The logic of decision (Second Ed.)
  86. Johnson-Laird,, 1983, Mental models
  87. Johnson-Laird,, 2006, How we reason
  88. Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1993). Models and deductive rationality. In K. Manktelow & D. Over (Eds.), Rationality: Psychological and philosophical perspectives (pp. 177–210). London: Routledge.
  89. Jungermann, H. (1986). The two camps on rationality. In H. R. Arkes & K. R. Hammond (Eds.), Judgment and decision making (pp. 627–641). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
  90. Kahneman,, 2000, A psychological point of view: Violations of rational rules as a diagnostic of mental processes., Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10.1017/S0140525X00403432 · DOI
  91. Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 49–81). New York: Cambridge University Press.
  92. Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2005). A model of heuristic judgment. In K. J. Holyoak & R. G. Morrison (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 267–293). New York: Cambridge University Press.
  93. Kahneman,, 2006, Would you be happier if you were richer? A focusing illusion., Science, 10.1126/science.1129688 · DOI
  94. Kahneman,, 1972, Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness., Cognitive Psychology, 10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3 · DOI
  95. Kahneman,, 1983, Can irrationality be intelligently discussed?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10.1017/S0140525X00017246 · DOI
  96. Kahneman,, 1996, On the reality of cognitive illusions., Psychological Review, 10.1037/0033-295X.103.3.582 · DOI
  97. Kanazawa,, 2004, General intelligence as a domain-specific adaptation., Psychological Review, 10.1037/0033-295X.111.2.512 · DOI
  98. Kane,, 2003, The intelligent brain in conflict., Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00193-1 · DOI
  99. Kaufman,, 2010, Implicit learning as an ability., Cognition, 10.1016/j.cognition.2010.05.011 · DOI · Paper page
  100. Klaczynski,, 1997, Goal-oriented critical reasoning and individual differences in critical reasoning biases., Journal of Educational Psychology, 10.1037/0022-0663.89.3.470 · DOI
  101. Klaczynski,, 2005, Domain-specific identity, epistemic regulation, and intellectual ability as predictors of belief-based reasoning: A dual-process perspective., Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 10.1016/j.jecp.2005.05.001 · DOI
  102. Klaczynski,, 2000, Personal theories, intellectual ability, and epistemological beliefs: Adult age differences in everyday reasoning tasks., Psychology and Aging, 10.1037/0882-7974.15.3.400 · DOI
  103. Koehler,, 2009, Probability matching in choice under uncertainty: Intuition versus deliberation., Cognition, 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.003 · DOI · Paper page
  104. Koehler,, 1996, The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative and methodological challenges., Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10.1017/S0140525X00041157 · DOI
  105. Kokis,, 2002, Heuristic and analytic processing: Age trends and associations with cognitive ability and cognitive styles., Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 10.1016/S0022-0965(02)00121-2 · DOI · Paper page
  106. Krueger,, 2004, Towards a balanced social psychology: Causes, consequences and cures for the problem-seeking approach to social cognition and behavior., Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10.1017/S0140525X04000081 · DOI
  107. Kuhberger,, 2002, The rationality of risky decisions: A changing message., Theory and Psychology, 10.1177/0959354302012004293 · DOI
  108. Larrick, R. P. (2004). Debiasing. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making (pp. 316–337). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
  109. Lee,, 2006, Gricean charity: The Gricean turn in psychology., Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 10.1177/0048393106287235 · DOI
  110. Lepine,, 2005, What makes working memory spans so predictive of high-level cognition?, Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 10.3758/BF03196363 · DOI
  111. Li,, 2009, “100% of anything looks good:” The appeal of one hundred percent., Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 10.3758/PBR.16.1.156 · DOI
  112. Lieberman, M. D. (2003). Reflexive and reflective judgment processes: A social cognitive neuroscience approach. In J. P. Forgas, K. R. Williams, & W. von Hippel (Eds.), Social judgments: Implicit and explicit processes (pp. 44–67). New York: Cambridge University Press.
  113. Lieberman, M. D. (2009). What zombies can't do: A social cognitive neuroscience approach to the irreducibility of reflective consciousness. In J. St. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds: Dual processes and beyond (pp. 293–316). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
  114. Luce,, 1957, Games and decisions
  115. Macpherson,, 2007, Cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and instructional set as predictors of critical thinking., Learning and Individual Differences, 10.1016/j.lindif.2007.05.003 · DOI · Paper page
  116. Manktelow, K. I. (2004). Reasoning and rationality: The pure and the practical. In K. I. Manktelow & M. C. Chung (Eds.), Psychology of reasoning: Theoretical and historical perspectives (pp. 157–177). Hove, England: Psychology Press.
  117. Marewski,, 2010, Good judgments do not require complex cognition., Current Directions in Psychological Science
  118. Matthews,, 2002, Emotional intelligence: Science and myth, 10.7551/mitpress/2704.001.0001 · DOI
  119. McClure,, 2004, Separate neural systems value immediate and delayed monetary rewards., Science, 10.1126/science.1100907 · DOI · Paper page
  120. Milkman,, 2009, How can decision making be improved?, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01142.x · DOI
  121. Minsky,, 1985, The society of mind
  122. Moors,, 2006, Automaticity: A theoretical and conceptual analysis., Psychological Bulletin, 10.1037/0033-2909.132.2.297 · DOI
  123. Murphy, D., & Stich, S. (2000). Darwin in the madhouse: Evolutionary psychology and the classification of mental disorders. In P. Carruthers & A. Chamberlain (Eds.), Evolution and the human mind: Modularity, language and meta-cognition (pp. 62–92). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
  124. Newstead,, 2004, Individual differences in deductive reasoning., Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 10.1080/02724980343000116 · DOI
  125. Norman, D. A., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and automatic control of behavior. In R. J. Davidson, G. E. Schwartz, & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation (pp. 1–18). New York: Plenum.
  126. Norris,, 1989, Evaluating critical thinking
  127. Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (1998). An introduction to rational models of cognition. In M. Oaksford & N. Chater (Eds.), Rational models of cognition (pp. 1–18). New York: Oxford University Press.
  128. Oaksford,, 2007, Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning, 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524496.001.0001 · DOI
  129. Oechssler,, 2009, Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases., Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.018 · DOI · Paper page
  130. Over,, 2000, Ecological rationality and its heuristics., Thinking and Reasoning
  131. Over, D. E. (2004). Rationality and the normative/descriptive distinction. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making (pp. 3–18). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
  132. Parker,, 2005, Decision-making competence: External validation through an individual differences approach., Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 10.1002/bdm.481 · DOI
  133. Perkins,, 1995, Outsmarting IQ: The emerging science of learnable intelligence
  134. Perner,, 1991, Understanding the representational mind
  135. Plato, 1945, The republic
  136. Pollock,, 1995, Cognitive carpentry, 10.7551/mitpress/1887.001.0001 · DOI
  137. Postman,, 1988, Conscientious objections
  138. Prado,, 2007, Overcoming perceptual features in logical reasoning: A parametric functional magnetic resonance imaging study., Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10.1162/jocn.2007.19.4.642 · DOI
  139. Reber,, 1993, Implicit learning and tacit knowledge
  140. Rescher,, 1988, Rationality: A philosophical inquiry into the nature and rationale of reason
  141. Rips,, 1994, The psychology of proof, 10.7551/mitpress/5680.001.0001 · DOI
  142. Sá,, 2005, Thinking about personal theories: Individual differences in the coordination of theory and evidence., Personality and Individual Differences, 10.1016/j.paid.2004.07.012 · DOI
  143. Sá,, 2001, The domain specificity and generality of mental contamination: Accuracy and projection in judgments of mental content., British Journal of Psychology, 10.1348/000712601162194 · DOI
  144. Sá,, 1999, The domain specificity and generality of belief bias: Searching for a generalizable critical thinking skill., Journal of Educational Psychology, 10.1037/0022-0663.91.3.497 · DOI
  145. Salthouse,, 2003, Executive functioning as a potential mediator of age-related cognitive decline in normal adults., Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 10.1037/0096-3445.132.4.566 · DOI · Paper page
  146. Salthouse,, 2008, Why is working memory related to fluid intelligence?, Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 10.3758/PBR.15.2.364 · DOI
  147. Samuels, R. (2005). The complexity of cognition: Tractability arguments for massive modularity. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich (Eds.), The innate mind (pp. 107–121). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
  148. Samuels, R. (2009). The magical number two, plus or minus: Dual-process theory as a theory of cognitive kinds. In J. S. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds: Dual processes and beyond (pp. 129–146). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
  149. Samuels, R., & Stich, S. P. (2004). Rationality and psychology. In A. R. Mele & P. Rawling (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of rationality (pp. 279–300). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
  150. Savage,, 1954, The foundations of statistics
  151. Schelling,, 1984, Choice and consequence: Perspectives of an errant economist
  152. Schneider,, 2003, Controlled and automatic processing: Behavior, theory, and biological processing., Cognitive Science, 10.1207/s15516709cog2703_8 · DOI
  153. Schommer-Aikins,, 2004, Explaining the epistemological belief system: Introducing the embedded systemic model and coordinated research approach., Educational Psychologist, 10.1207/s15326985ep3901_3 · DOI
  154. Sloman,, 1996, The empirical case for two systems of reasoning., Psychological Bulletin, 10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.3 · DOI
  155. Sloman, S. A. (2002). Two systems of reasoning. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 379–396). New York: Cambridge University Press.
  156. Slovic,, 2006, Risk perception and affect., Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2006.00461.x · DOI · Paper page
  157. Smith,, 2000, Dual-process models in social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems., Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0402_01 · DOI
  158. Sperber, D. (1994). The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 39–67). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
  159. Stanovich,, 1999, Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning, 10.4324/9781410603432 · DOI
  160. Stanovich,, 2001, Reductionism in the study of intelligence: Review of “Looking Down on Human Intelligence” by Ian Deary., Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01590-4 · DOI
  161. Stanovich, K. E. (2002). Rationality, intelligence, and levels of analysis in cognitive science: Is dysrationalia possible? In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Why smart people can be so stupid (pp. 124–158). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  162. Stanovich, K. E. (2003). The fundamental computational biases of human cognition: Heuristics that (sometimes) impair decision making and problem solving. In J. E. Davidson & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), The psychology of problem solving (pp. 291–342). New York: Cambridge University Press.
  163. Stanovich,, 2004, The robot's rebellion: Finding meaning in the age of Darwin, 10.7208/chicago/9780226771199.001.0001 · DOI
  164. Stanovich, K. E. (2009a). Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory? In J. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds: Dual processes and beyond (pp. 55–88). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. · DOI
  165. Stanovich,, 2009, What intelligence tests miss: The psychology of rational thought
  166. Stanovich,, 2010, Decision making and rationality in the modern world
  167. Stanovich,, 1997, Reasoning independently of prior belief and individual differences in actively open-minded thinking., Journal of Educational Psychology, 10.1037/0022-0663.89.2.342 · DOI
  168. Stanovich,, 1998, Cognitive ability and variation in selection task performance., Thinking and Reasoning
  169. Stanovich,, 1998, Individual differences in framing and conjunction effects., Thinking and Reasoning
  170. Stanovich,, 1998, Individual differences in rational thought., Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 10.1037/0096-3445.127.2.161 · DOI
  171. Stanovich,, 1998, Who uses base rates and P(D/∼H)? An analysis of individual differences., Memory and Cognition, 10.3758/BF03211379 · DOI
  172. Stanovich,, 1999, Discrepancies between normative and descriptive models of decision making and the understanding/acceptance principle., Cognitive Psychology, 10.1006/cogp.1998.0700 · DOI
  173. Stanovich,, 2000, Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10.1017/S0140525X00003435 · DOI
  174. Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2003). Evolutionary versus instrumental goals: How evolutionary psychology misconceives human rationality. In D. E. Over (Ed.), Evolution and the psychology of thinking: The debate (pp. 171–230). Hove, England and New York: Psychology Press.
  175. Stanovich,, 2007, Natural myside bias is independent of cognitive ability., Thinking and Reasoning, 10.1080/13546780600780796 · DOI · Paper page
  176. Stanovich,, 2008, On the failure of intelligence to predict myside bias and one-sided bias., Thinking and Reasoning, 10.1080/13546780701679764 · DOI
  177. Stanovich,, 2008, On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability., Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 · DOI · Paper page
  178. Stein,, 1996, Without good reason: The rationality debate in philosophy and cognitive science
  179. Sternberg,, 2003, Wisdom, intelligence, and creativity synthesized, 10.1017/CBO9780511509612 · DOI
  180. Sternberg,, 1997, Are cognitive styles still in style?, American Psychologist, 10.1037/0003-066X.52.7.700 · DOI
  181. Sternberg,, 2008, Styles of learning and thinking matter in instruction and assessment., Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00095.x · DOI
  182. Stich,, 1990, The fragmentation of reason
  183. Taub,, 2004, A confirmatory factor analysis of Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory and cross-age invariance of the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Cognitive Abilities III., School Psychology Quarterly, 10.1521/scpq.19.1.72.29409 · DOI
  184. Tetlock,, 2002, The great rationality debate., Psychological Science, 10.1111/1467-9280.00418 · DOI
  185. Thagard,, 1983, Rationality and charity., Philosophy of Science, 10.1086/289108 · DOI
  186. Thaler,, 2008, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness
  187. Toates,, 2005, Evolutionary psychology: Towards a more integrative model., Biology and Philosophy, 10.1007/s10539-004-0756-3 · DOI
  188. Toates,, 2006, A model of the hierarchy of behavior, cognition, and consciousness., Consciousness and Cognition, 10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.008 · DOI
  189. Toplak,, 2002, The domain specificity and generality of disjunctive reasoning: Searching for a generalizable critical thinking skill., Journal of Educational Psychology, 10.1037/0022-0663.94.1.197 · DOI
  190. Toplak,, 2003, Associations between myside bias on an informal reasoning task and amount of post-secondary education., Applied Cognitive Psychology, 10.1002/acp.915 · DOI
  191. von, 1944, The theory of games and economic behavior
  192. Vranas,, 2000, Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky., Cognition, 10.1016/S0010-0277(99)00084-0 · DOI
  193. Wang,, 2009, Money and fame: Vividness effects in the National Basketball Association., Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 10.1002/bdm.609 · DOI
  194. Wason,, 1975, Dual processes in reasoning?, Cognition
  195. West,, 2008, Heuristics and biases as measures of critical thinking: Associations with cognitive ability and thinking dispositions., Journal of Educational Psychology, 10.1037/a0012842 · DOI · Paper page
  196. Wilson,, 2002, Strangers to ourselves
  197. Wilson,, 2005, Affective forecasting: Knowing what to want., Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00355.x · DOI · Paper page
  198. Wu, G., Zhang, J., & Gonzalez, R. (2004). Decision under risk. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making (pp. 399–423). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
  199. Zeidner, M., & Matthews, G. (2000). Intelligence and personality. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of intelligence (pp. 581–610). New York: Cambridge University Press.
  200. Zelazo,, 2004, The development of conscious control in childhood., Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10.1016/j.tics.2003.11.001 · DOI

Cited by

Sorted by citations

See all 169

Metadata

Authors
Stanovich, K. E.
Affiliations
University of Toronto (CA)
Corresponding author
Stanovich, Keith E.
ORCID
Stanovich, Keith E.
Venue
The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Published
2012-11-21
Pages
433-455
DOI
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0022
OpenAlex
W2184681077
Cited by
169
References
33
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 2
FWCI
17.64
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Cognitive Abilities and Testing
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
Keywords
rationality, intelligence, individual differences in reasoning, dual-process theory, irrationality, cognitive models

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On the Distinction Between Rationality and Intelligence: Implications for Understanding Individual Differences in Reasoning. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0022
The paper
Stanovich, K. E. (2012). On the Distinction Between Rationality and Intelligence: Implications for Understanding Individual Differences in Reasoning. The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0022