The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
Abstract
This paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auction data. Considering first-price sealed-bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm, we show that the underlying distribution of bidders' private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions. Using the theory of minimax, we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data. We then propose a two-step kernel-based estimator that converges at the optimal rate.
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Cites
(2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.5.i · Cited by 15,100
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Approximation Theorems of Mathematical Statistics
Serfling, R. J. (1980) · Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics · doi:10.1002/9780470316481 · Cited by 5,851
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
Nadaraya, E. A. (1964) · Theory of Probability & Its Applications · doi:10.1137/1109020 · Cited by 3,462
Watson, G. S. (1964) · PUB – Publications at Bielefeld University (Bielefeld University) · Cited by 2,661
A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation
Ireland, N. (1994) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(94)90034-5 · Cited by 2,554
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159 · Cited by 2,147
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0270 · Cited by 2,127
Optimal Global Rates of Convergence for Nonparametric Regression
Stone, C. J. (1982) · The Annals of Statistics · doi:10.1214/aos/1176345969 · Cited by 1,497
Cited by
Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions
Krasnokutskaya, E., & Seim, K. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2653 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., & Vuong, Q.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2000-05
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 525-574
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2120416704
- Cited by
- 710
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 20.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.