The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
Abstract
This paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auction data. Considering first-price sealed-bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm, we show that the underlying distribution of bidders' private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions. Using the theory of minimax, we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data. We then propose a two-step kernel-based estimator that converges at the optimal rate.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.5.i · Cited by 15,100
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Approximation Theorems of Mathematical Statistics
Serfling, R. J. (1980) · Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics · doi:10.1002/9780470316481 · Cited by 5,851
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
Nadaraya, E. A. (1964) · Theory of Probability & Its Applications · doi:10.1137/1109020 · Cited by 3,462
Watson, G. S. (1964) · PUB – Publications at Bielefeld University (Bielefeld University) · Cited by 2,661
A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation
Ireland, N. (1994) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(94)90034-5 · Cited by 2,554
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159 · Cited by 2,147
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0270 · Cited by 2,127
Optimal Global Rates of Convergence for Nonparametric Regression
Stone, C. J. (1982) · The Annals of Statistics · doi:10.1214/aos/1176345969 · Cited by 1,497
Emons, W. (2007) · Cited by 1,187
Statistical Estimation: Asymptotic Theory
Samaniego, F. J. (2014) · Chapman & Hall/CRC eBooks · doi:10.1201/b16414-10 · Cited by 1,155
Härdle, W. (1991) · Springer Series in Statistics · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-4432-5 · Cited by 551
A Competitive-Bidding Strategy
Friedman, L. (1956) · Operations Research · doi:10.1287/opre.4.1.104 · Cited by 527
Distribution Free Tests of Independence Based on the Sample Distribution Function
Blum, J. R., Kiefer, J., & Rosenblatt, M. (1961) · The Annals of Mathematical Statistics · doi:10.1214/aoms/1177705055 · Cited by 490
Minimax Theory of Image Reconstruction
Korostelev, A. P., & Tsybakov, A. B. (1993) · Lecture Notes in Statistics · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-2712-0 · Cited by 483
Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions
Graham, D. A., & Marshall, R. C. (1987) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261512 · Cited by 428
An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information
(1988) · Cited by 360
Econometrics of First-Price Auctions
Laffont, J.-J., Ossard, H., & Vuong, Q. (1995) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171804 · Cited by 352
Self-citationDeciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions
Paarsch, H. J. (1992) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(92)90035-p · Cited by 310
Kernel estimators of regression functions
Bierens, H. J. (2008) · Advances in Econometrics · doi:10.1017/ccol0521344301.003 · Cited by 249
Asymptotic Properties of the Product Limit Estimate Under Random Truncation
Wang, M.-C., Jewell, N. P., & Tsai, W.-Y. (1986) · The Annals of Statistics · doi:10.1214/aos/1176350180 · Cited by 247
Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data
Laffont, J.-J. (1997) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(96)00017-7 · Cited by 195
The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auction
Porter, R. H. (1995) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951695 · Cited by 194
Conditions for Identification in Nonparametric and Parametric Models
Roehrig, C. S. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911080 · Cited by 164
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices
Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel, & Vuong (1994) · Annales d'Économie et de Statistique · doi:10.2307/20075949 · Cited by 164
The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions
Porter, R. (1992) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4185 · Cited by 158
Donald, S. G., & Paarsch, H. J. (1996) · Econometric Theory · doi:10.1017/s0266466600006848 · Cited by 125
Utreras, F. I. (1985) · Numerische Mathematik · doi:10.1007/bf01389460 · Cited by 66
Ahn, H. (1995) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(94)01636-e · Cited by 32
Cited by
Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions
Haile, P. A., & Tamer, E. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/344801 · Cited by 487
Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs
Bajari, P., Houghton, S., & Tadelis, S. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.4.1288 · Cited by 363
Chapter 63 Econometric Tools for Analyzing Market Outcomes
Ackerberg, D., Lanier Benkard, C., Berry, S., & Pakes, A. (2007) · Handbook of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4412(07)06063-1 · Cited by 349
Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
Haile, P., Hong, H., & Shum, M. (2003) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10105 · Cited by 331
Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions
Krasnokutskaya, E., & Seim, K. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2653 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., & Vuong, Q.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2000-05
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 525-574
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2120416704
- Cited by
- 710
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 20.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.