Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 168

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Reinforcement-based vs. Belief-based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-information Games

Feltovich, Nick · 2000 · Econometrica

Abstract

This paper examines the abilities of learning models to describe subject behavior in experiments. A new experiment involving multistage asymmetric-information games is conducted, and the experimental data are compared with the predictions of Nash equilibrium and two types of learning model: a reinforcement-based model similar to that used by Roth and Erev (1995), and belief-based models similar to the ‘cautious fictitious play’ of Fudenberg and Levine (1995, 1998) These models make predictions that are qualitatively similar cycling around the Nash equilibrium that is much more apparent than movement toward it. While subject behavior is not adequately described by Nash equilibrium, it is consistent with the qualitative predictions of the learning models. We examine several criteria for quantitatively comparing the predictions of alternative models. According to almost all of these criteria, both types of learning model outperform Nash equilibrium. According to some criteria, the reinforcement-based model performs better than any version of the belief-based model; according to others, there exist versions of the belief-based model that outperform the reinforcement-based model. The abilities of these models are further tested with respect to the results of other published experiments. The relative performance of the two learning models depends on the experiment, and varies according to which criterion of success is used. Again, both models perform better than equilibrium in most cases.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/1468-0262.00125

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 168

Metadata

Authors
Feltovich, N.
Venue
Econometrica
Published
2000-05
Volume
68
Issue
3
Pages
605-641
ISSN
  • 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0262
OpenAlex
W2055311105
Cited by
168
References
0
FWCI
29.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Reinforcement-based vs. Belief-based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-information Games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1468-0262.00125
The paper
Feltovich, N. (2000). Reinforcement-based vs. Belief-based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-information Games. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00125

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.