Risk Aversion and Expected-utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem
Abstract
USING EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY, economists model risk aversion as arising solely because the utility function over wealth is concave.This diminishing-marginal-utility-ofwealth theory of risk aversion is psychologically intuitive, and surely helps explain some of our aversion to large-scale risk: We dislike vast uncertainty in lifetime wealth because a dollar that helps us avoid poverty is more valuable than a dollar that helps us become very rich.Yet this theory also implies that people are approximately risk neutral when stakes are small.Arrow (1971, p. 100) shows that an expected-utility maximizer with a differentiable utility function will always want to take a sufficiently small stake in any positiveexpected-value bet.That is, expected-utility maximizers are (almost everywhere) arbitrarily close to risk neutral when stakes are arbitrarily small.While most economists understand this formal limit result, fewer appreciate that the approximate risk-neutrality prediction holds not just for negligible stakes, but for quite sizable and economically important stakes.Economists often invoke expected-utility theory to explain substantial (observed or posited) risk aversion over stakes where the theory actually predicts virtual risk neutrality.While not broadly appreciated, the inability of expected-utility theory to provide a plausible account of risk aversion over modest stakes has become oral tradition among some subsets of researchers, and has been illustrated in writing in a variety of different contexts using standard utility functions.2In this paper, I reinforce this previous research by presenting a theorem that calibrates a relationship between risk attitudes over small and large stakes.The theorem shows that, within the expected-utility model, anything but virtual risk neutrality over modest stakes implies manifestly unrealistic risk aversion over 1 Many people, including
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For risk aversion to achieve the optimal choice for a small project, it must be too high to do the same for a large project, a point related to Rabin (2000).
“The issue identi fi ed here is that for risk aversion to achieve the optimal choice for a small project, it must be too high to do the same for a large project, a point related to Rabin (2000).”
From Talking the talk, not walking the walk: The coevolution of overconfidence and loss aversion (2026) · cites this paper as Rabin (2000)
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- Authors
- Rabin, M.
- Corresponding author
- Rabin, Matthew
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2000-09
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1281-1292
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W3022853033
- Cited by
- 1,624
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 29 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 74 · 2023: 60 · 2022: 54 · 2021: 66 · 2020: 79 · 2019: 98 · 2018: 77 · 2017: 95 · 2016: 72 · 2015: 81 · 2014: 89 · 2013: 79 · 2012: 85
- FWCI
- 15.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (9709485)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
- Keywords
- risk aversion, expected utility theory, concave utility
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