Cited by 1,624Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesFinancial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis

Risk Aversion and Expected-utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem

Rabin, Matthew·2000·Econometrica

Abstract

USING EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY, economists model risk aversion as arising solely because the utility function over wealth is concave.This diminishing-marginal-utility-ofwealth theory of risk aversion is psychologically intuitive, and surely helps explain some of our aversion to large-scale risk: We dislike vast uncertainty in lifetime wealth because a dollar that helps us avoid poverty is more valuable than a dollar that helps us become very rich.Yet this theory also implies that people are approximately risk neutral when stakes are small.Arrow (1971, p. 100) shows that an expected-utility maximizer with a differentiable utility function will always want to take a sufficiently small stake in any positiveexpected-value bet.That is, expected-utility maximizers are (almost everywhere) arbitrarily close to risk neutral when stakes are arbitrarily small.While most economists understand this formal limit result, fewer appreciate that the approximate risk-neutrality prediction holds not just for negligible stakes, but for quite sizable and economically important stakes.Economists often invoke expected-utility theory to explain substantial (observed or posited) risk aversion over stakes where the theory actually predicts virtual risk neutrality.While not broadly appreciated, the inability of expected-utility theory to provide a plausible account of risk aversion over modest stakes has become oral tradition among some subsets of researchers, and has been illustrated in writing in a variety of different contexts using standard utility functions.2In this paper, I reinforce this previous research by presenting a theorem that calibrates a relationship between risk attitudes over small and large stakes.The theorem shows that, within the expected-utility model, anything but virtual risk neutrality over modest stakes implies manifestly unrealistic risk aversion over 1 Many people, including

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Crossref · 10.1111/1468-0262.00158

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  • For risk aversion to achieve the optimal choice for a small project, it must be too high to do the same for a large project, a point related to Rabin (2000).

    “The issue identi fi ed here is that for risk aversion to achieve the optimal choice for a small project, it must be too high to do the same for a large project, a point related to Rabin (2000).”

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Authors
Rabin, M.
Corresponding author
Rabin, Matthew
Venue
Econometrica
Published
2000-09
Volume
68
Issue
5
Pages
1281-1292
ISSN
  • 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0262
OpenAlex
W3022853033
Cited by
1,624
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 74 · 2023: 60 · 2022: 54 · 2021: 66 · 2020: 79 · 2019: 98 · 2018: 77 · 2017: 95 · 2016: 72 · 2015: 81 · 2014: 89 · 2013: 79 · 2012: 85
FWCI
15.26
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Econometrica (publishedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation (9709485)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
Keywords
risk aversion, expected utility theory, concave utility

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