The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
Open accessAbstract
Reinforcement learning and stochastic fictitious play are apparent rivals as models of human learning. They embody quite different assumptions about the processing of information and optimization. This paper compares their properties and finds that they are far more similar than were thought. In particular, the expected motion of stochastic fictitious play and reinforcement learning with experimentation can both be written as a perturbed form of the evolutionary replicator dynamics. Therefore they will in many cases have the same asymptotic behavior. In particular, local stability of mixed equilibria under stochastic fictitious play implies local stability under perturbed reinforcement learning. The main identifiable difference between the two models is speed: stochastic fictitious play gives rise to faster learning.
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Cites
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502
Myles, G. D. (1993) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/0176-2680(93)90012-j · Cited by 875
Cited by
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (2003) · Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society · doi:10.1090/s0273-0979-03-00988-1 · Cited by 1,354
Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion
Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2020) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20190623 · Cited by 708
Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games
Camerer, C. F., Ho, T.-H., & Chong, J.-K. (2002) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2002.2927 · Cited by 306
Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
Battalio, R., Samuelson, L., & Van Huyck, J. (2001) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00212 · Cited by 255
On the Properties of the Softmax Function with Application in Game Theory and Reinforcement Learning
Gao, B., & Pavel, L. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1704.00805 · Cited by 207
Metadata
- Authors
- Hopkins, E.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2002-11
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2141-2166
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2171731198
- Cited by
- 235
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 14.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.