The DOI matches its Crossref record; 169 of the 169 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Evolutionary game dynamics
Open accessAbstract
Evolutionary game dynamics is the application of population dynamical methods to game theory. It has been introduced by evolutionary biologists, anticipated in part by classical game theorists. In this survey, we present an overview of the many brands of deterministic dynamical systems motivated by evolutionary game theory, including ordinary differential equations (and, in particular, the replicator equation), differential inclusions (the best response dynamics), difference equations (as, for instance, fictitious play) and reaction-diffusion systems. A recurrent theme (the so-called ‘folk theorem of evolutionary game theory’) is the close connection of the dynamical approach with the Nash equilibrium, but we show that a static, equilibrium-based viewpoint is, on principle, unable to always account for the long-term behaviour of players adjusting their behaviour to maximise their payoff.
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Cites
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Self-citationCooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
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Networks beyond pairwise interactions: Structure and dynamics
Battiston, F., Cencetti, G., Iacopini, I., Latora, V., Lucas, M., Patania, A., Young, J.-G., & Petri, G. (2020) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2020.05.004 · Cited by 1,602
Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological Games
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Self-citationCoevolution of Strategy and Structure in Complex Networks with Dynamical Linking
Pacheco, J. M., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.97.258103 · Cited by 697
A survey on networking games in telecommunications
Altman, E., Boulogne, T., El-Azouzi, R., Jiménez, T., & Wynter, L. (2006) · Computers & Operations Research · doi:10.1016/j.cor.2004.06.005 · Cited by 552
Metadata
- Authors
- Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K.
- Venue
- Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society
- Publisher
- American Mathematical Society (AMS)
- Published
- 2003-07-10
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 479-519
- ISSN
- 0002-9904 (ISSN-L)
- 0273-0979
- 1088-9485
- OpenAlex
- W2036083037
- Cited by
- 1,354
- References
- 169
- FWCI
- 75.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.