The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact
Abstract
We use a stylised model to analyse the Stability and Growth Pact for countries that have formed the European Monetary Union (EMU). In our model, shortsighted governments fail to internalise the consequences of their debt policies for the common inflation rate fully. Therefore, while governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact in the absence of a monetary union, they do so with monetary union to restrain this externality. With uncertainty, a monetary union combined with an appropriately designed pact will be strictly preferred to autonomy. With differences in initial conditions, conflicts of interest arise. We study the Nash bargaining solution.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
Equilibria under ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary and fiscal policies
Leeper, E. M. (1991) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(91)90007-b · Cited by 2,058
A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298021 · Cited by 1,568
(1992) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,366
Sims, C. A. (1994) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01215378 · Cited by 1,052
The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence
Eijffinger, S. C. W., & de Haan, J. (1995) · Research portal (Tilburg University) · Cited by 530
Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (1988) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2759 · Cited by 511
Price-level determinacy without control of a monetary aggregate
Woodford, M. (1995) · Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy · doi:10.1016/0167-2231(95)90033-0 · Cited by 505
Why do we have nominal government debt?
Bohn, H. (1988) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(88)90050-5 · Cited by 187
The Precarious Fiscal Foundations of EMU
Sims, C. A. (1999) · De Economist · doi:10.1023/a:1003819626903 · Cited by 109
Cited by
The European Sovereign Debt Crisis
Lane, P. R. (2012) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.26.3.49 · Cited by 985
Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union
Debrun, X., Moulin, L., Turrini, A., Ayuso-i-Casals, J., & Kumar, M. S. (2008) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2008.00199.x · Cited by 477
Good, bad or ugly? On the effects of fiscal rules with creative accounting
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(02)00076-2 · Cited by 366
Metadata
- Authors
- Beetsma, R., & Uhlig, H.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1999-10-01
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 458
- Pages
- 546-571
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2117132355
- Cited by
- 351
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 23.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1468-0297.00462
- The paper
- Beetsma, R., & Uhlig, H. (1999). An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00462
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.