The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bubbles and Crises
Abstract
In recent financial crises a bubble, in which asset prices rise, is followed by a collapse and widespread default. Bubbles are caused by agency relationships in the banking sector. Investors use money borrowed from banks to invest in risky assets, which are relatively attractive because investors can avoid losses in low payoff states by defaulting on the loan. This risk shifting leads investors to bid up the asset prices. Risk can originate in both the real and financial sectors. Financial fragility occurs when positive credit expansion is insufficient to prevent a crisis.
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Citations
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Cited by
Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: a Review and Synthesis
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Metadata
- Authors
- Allen, F., & Gale, D.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-01-01
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 460
- Pages
- 236-255
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2001891240
- Cited by
- 752
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 30.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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