The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model
Abstract
This paper develops an adverse selection model where peer group systems are shown to trigger lower interest rates and remove credit rationing in the case where borrowers are uninformed about their potential partners and ex post state verification (or auditing) by banks is costly. Peer group formation reduces interest rates due to a ‘collateral effect’, namely, cross subsidisation amongst borrowers acts as collateral behind a loan. By uncovering such a collateral effect, this paper shows that peer group systems can be viewed as an effective risk pooling mechanism, and thus enhance efficiency, not just in the full information set up.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769 · cited 1×
“A well-known family of adverse selection models in the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) tradition demonstrates that when banks are imperfectly informed about the riskiness of borrowers' projects and therefore cannot discriminate against risky borrowers, interest rates become inefficiently high, and worthy…”
Background
Cited by
Morduch, J. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.4.1569 · Cited by 2,360
The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice
Ghatak, M., & Guinnane, T. W. (1999) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00041-3 · Cited by 879
Group lending, local information and peer selection
Ghatak, M. (1999) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00035-8 · Cited by 720
Social Connections and Group Banking
Karlan, D. S. (2007) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02015.x · Cited by 501
Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect
Ghatak, M. (2000) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00556 · Cited by 416
Metadata
- Authors
- De Aghion, B. A., & Gollier, C.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-07-01
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 465
- Pages
- 632-643
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2008018630
- Cited by
- 244
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 12.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- De Aghion, B. A., & Gollier, C. (2000). Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00557
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.