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Cited by 416

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect

Open access
Ghatak, Maitreesh·2000·The Economic Journal
DOI 10.1111/1468-0297.00556
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Abstract

We look at an economic environment where borrowers have some information about the nature of each other's projects that lenders do not. We show that joint‐liability lending contracts, similar to those used by credit cooperatives and group‐lending schemes, will induce endogenous peer selection in the formation of groups in a way that the instrument of joint liability can be used as a screening device to exploit this local information. This can improve welfare and repayment rates if standard screening instruments such as collateral are unavailable.

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Metadata

Authors
Ghatak, M.
Venue
The Economic Journal
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2000-07-01
Volume
110
Issue
465
Pages
601-631
ISSN
  • 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0297
DOI
10.1111/1468-0297.00556
OpenAlex
W2066578681
Cited by
416
References
23
FWCI
15.28
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1468-0297.00556
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Ghatak, M. (2000). Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00556

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.