The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation
Abstract
We investigate how fairness concerns influence individual behaviour in social dilemmas. Using a Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma experiment we analyse the extent to which co‐operation is conditional on first‐mover co‐operation, repetition, economic incentives, subject pool (United Kingdom vs. United States) and gender. We find the most important variable influencing co‐operation is the first‐mover's choice, supporting the argument that co‐operative behaviour in social dilemmas reflects reciprocation rather than unconditional altruism. However, we also find that co‐operation decreases with repetition, and reciprocation falls as its material cost rises.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825
Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1996) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0081 · Cited by 1,126 · cited 1×
“Falk and Fischbacher (1998) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) extend Rabin's analysis to sequential-move games of the type studied here.”
BackgroundLearning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
Slonim, R., & Roth, A. E. (1998) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2998575 · Cited by 512
Cited by
Gender Differences in Preferences
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.2.448 · Cited by 5,694
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001 · Cited by 2,416
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003 · Cited by 1,867
THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
SEFTON, M., SHUPP, R., & WALKER, J. M. (2007) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00051.x · Cited by 649
Self-citationThe neural correlates of theory of mind within interpersonal interactions
Rilling, J. K., Sanfey, A. G., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2004) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.04.015 · Cited by 637
Metadata
- Authors
- Clark, K., & Sefton, M.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2001-01-01
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 468
- Pages
- 51-68
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2098234253
- Cited by
- 244
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 35.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1468-0297.00588
- The paper
- Clark, K., & Sefton, M. (2001). The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00588
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.