Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.
Open accessIntegrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Fund allocation in the Dictator Game is considered a real-life test of altruism because giving is costly and not subject to strategic reciprocity, particularly when identities are anonymous.
“Fund allocation in the Dictator Game is considered a real-life test of altruism since it involves a ‘put your money where your mouth is’ decision where giving to another is both costly and not subject to strategic considerations of reciprocity; this is particularly the case when “Dictator” and “Recipient” identities are made anonymous [4].”
From The oxytocin receptor (OXTR) contributes to prosocial fund allocations in the dictator game and the social value orientations task (2009) · cites this paper as [4]
Cited by
Sorted by citations
What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.2.153 · Cited by 2,668 · see citing works
Harrison, G. W., & List, J. A. (2004) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051043004577 · Cited by 2,282 · see citing works
Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
Andreoni, J., & Miller, J. H. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00302 · Cited by 2,012 · see citing works
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898 · see citing works
Engel, C. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9283-7 · Cited by 1,823 · see citing works
“ECKEL, CATHERINE C. and PHILIP J. GROSSMAN (1996).”
BackgroundSocial Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Reply
Hoffman, E. N., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. L. S. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.340 · Cited by 1,183 · see citing works
Are women less selfish than men?: Evidence from dictator experiments.
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1998) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00311 · Cited by 1,000 · see citing works
“While there is evidence that knowledge of a partner's sex can in¯uence the decisions of subjects (Eckel and Grossman, 1996b), there is no evidence that single-sex groupings, such as we have employed, in¯uence subjects' play.”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationSocial Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games
Hoffman, E. N., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. L. S. (2000) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528347.009 · Cited by 989 · see citing works
Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics
Smith, V. L. S. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322156954 · Cited by 950 · see citing works
Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories
Konow, J. (2003) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205103771800013 · Cited by 854 · see citing works
“Dictator experiments by Eckel and Grossman (1996) and myself (2002) have also demonstrated that the generosity of decision makers depends on the identity of counterparts.”
MethodSocial neuroeconomics: the neural circuitry of social preferences
Fehr, E., & Camerer, C. F. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.09.002 · Cited by 779 · see citing works
A mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice
Baumard, N., André, J., & Sperber, D. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002202 · Cited by 671 · see citing works
Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?
Bardsley, N. (2007) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9172-2 · Cited by 632 · see citing works
“See, for examples, Eckel and Grossman (1996) on anonymity and charities versus individuals as recipients, Hoffman et al. (1996) and Bohnet and Frey (1999) on social distance, Cherry et al. (2002) on earned versus unearned income, and Haley and Fessler (2005) on visual suggestions of observation.”
BackgroundLodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2005) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2005.00426.x · Cited by 588 · see citing works
The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation
Andreoni, J., Harbaugh, W. T., & Vesterlund, L. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157142 · Cited by 608 · see citing works
Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Comment
Bohnet, I., & Frey, B. S. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.335 · Cited by 521 · see citing works
Beyond the Self: Social Identity, Altruism, and Political Participation
Fowler, J. H., & Kam, C. D. (2007) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00577.x · Cited by 498 · see citing works
The sound of silence in prisoner's dilemma and dictator games
Bohnet, I., & Frey, B. S. (1999) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00121-8 · Cited by 490 · see citing works
“Eckel and Grossman (1996a) who compared an anonymous student with an established charity as recipients in a DG, observe an increase in donations from 10.6 percent to 31.0 percent when the recipient is the `deserving' Red Cross.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Relationship Between Economic Preferences and Psychological Personality Measures
Becker, A., Deckers, T., Dohmen, T., Falk, A., & Kosse, F. (2012) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-110922 · Cited by 477 · see citing works
“Social preferences include altruism (e.g. Eckel and Grossmann, 1996) and negative and positive reciprocity (e.g. Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).”
BackgroundBeyond sacrificial harm: a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J. (2018) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000093 · Cited by 434 · see citing works
Short-term compassion training increases prosocial behavior in a newly developed prosocial game
Leiberg, S., Klimecki, O., & Singer, T. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017798 · Cited by 442 · see citing works
“In the context of game theoretical paradigms, the dictator game is most commonly used for assessing altruistic acts towards others [31–34].”
BackgroundHonesty in Managerial Reporting
Evans, J. H., Hannan, R. L., Krishnan, R., et al. (2001) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2001.76.4.537 · Cited by 436 · see citing works
Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist
Ashraf, N., Camerer, C. F., & Loewenstein, G. F. (2005) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005774357897 · Cited by 434 · see citing works
“…only applies to those in “tolerable health and spirits” anticipates modern studies showing that people who are not in tolerable health and spirits—specifically, the clinically depressed— are the exceptional ones among us who are not optimistic wishful thinkers (for example, Taylor and Brown, 1994).”
Do people behave in experiments as in the field?—evidence from donations
Benz, M., & Meier, S. (2008) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9192-y · Cited by 428 · see citing works
“The experiments are most similar to the experiments by Eckel and Grossman (1996).”
BackgroundResultKimbrough, E. O., & Vostroknutov, A. (2015) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12152 · Cited by 379 · see citing works
Toward a Unifying Model of Identification With Groups: Integrating Theoretical Perspectives
Roccas, S., Sagiv, L., Schwartz, S. H., Halevy, N., & Eidelson, R. J. (2008) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868308319225 · Cited by 385 · see citing works
“People are more motivated to help when their help is perceived to be necessary (e.g., Eckel & Grossman, 1996; see also a review in Piliavin & Charng, 1990).”
BackgroundWhy volunteer? Evidence on the role of altruism, image, and incentives
Carpenter, J. P., & Myers, C. K. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.007 · Cited by 378 · see citing works
“Our proxy for altruism comes from a field experiment based on the original dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994) and a version in which a context similar to the decision to volunteer was emphasized (Eckel and Grossman, 1996).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialBEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF RECIPROCITY: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
Hoffman, E. N., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. L. S. (1998) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01719.x · Cited by 370 · see citing works
The Light vs. Dark Triad of Personality: Contrasting Two Very Different Profiles of Human Nature
Kaufman, S., Yaden, D., Hyde, E., & Tsukayama, E. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00467 · Cited by 318 · see citing works
Alfano, M. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139208536 · Cited by 356 · see citing works
An experimental test of warm glow giving
Crumpler, H., & Grossman, P. J. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.014 · Cited by 328 · see citing works
“As Eckel and Grossman (1996) argue “…altruism requires context (p. 184)”.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationDo Investors Care about Impact?
Heeb, F., Kölbel, J. F., Paetzold, F., & Zeisberger, S. (2023) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhac066 · Cited by 332 · see citing works
A Neurocomputational Model of Altruistic Choice and Its Implications
Hutcherson, C. A., Bushong, B., & Rangel, A. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.06.031 · Cited by 299 · see citing works
“This type of simple value calculation captures a wide range of behavioral patterns in altruistic choice (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Engel, 2011; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundTusche, A., Böckler, A., Kanske, P., Trautwein, F.-M., & Singer, T. (2016) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3392-15.2016 · Cited by 309 · see citing works
“…rated the extent to which each charity activated six different social mental processes that have previously been implicated in altruistic behavior (Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Moll et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2010; Hein et al., 2010; Mathur et al., 2010; Batson, 2011; Ma…”
BackgroundMore Is Better, But Fair Is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games
Ruffle, B. J. (1998) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0630 · Cited by 306 · see citing works
Minimal social cues in the dictator game
Rigdon, M. L., Ishii, K., Watabe, M., & Kitayama, S. (2009) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2009.02.002 · Cited by 302 · see citing works
Playing both roles in the trust game
Burks, S. V., Carpenter, J. P., & Verhoogen, E. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00093-8 · Cited by 299 · see citing works
Knafo, A., Israel, S., Darvasi, A., Bachner‐Melman, R., Uzefovsky, F., Cohen, L., Feldman, E., Lerer, E., Laiba, E., Raz, Y., et al. (2007) · Genes Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1111/j.1601-183x.2007.00341.x · Cited by 294 · see citing works
“As noted by Eckel & Grossman (1996) in their key paper, the behavior of subjects in dictator games is well documented and deviates from payoff maximization.”
BackgroundLet’s be honest: A review of experimental evidence of honesty and truth-telling
Rosenbaum, S. M., Billinger, S., & Stieglitz, N. (2014) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2014.10.002 · Cited by 294 · see citing works
“Such findings – for instance that subjects will be more prone to cheat if the dishonest gains were accrued by an established charity, thus ameliorating the intrinsic costs of lying (Lewis et al., 2012) are entirely consistent with similar experimental settings (for instance, Eckel & Grossman, 1996).”
ResultNeutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment
Klaus Abbink, A., & Hennig‐Schmidt, H. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z · Cited by 281 · see citing works
E XPERIMENTAL M ETHODS IN P OLITICAL S CIENCE
McDermott, R. (2002) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.091001.170657 · Cited by 285 · see citing works
“Numerous models of altruism (Forsythe et al. 1994, Eckel & Grossman 1996) typically assume that altruism is an embedded character trait within a given individual.”
BackgroundRationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms
Smith, V. L. S. (2007) · Chapman University Digital Commons (Chapman University) · Cited by 283 · see citing works
How payment systems affect physicians’ provision behaviour—An experimental investigation
Hennig‐Schmidt, H., Selten, R., & Wiesen, D. (2011) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.05.001 · Cited by 286 · see citing works
“To validate the actual transfer of the money, we applied a procedure like Eckel and Grossman (1996).”
InfluentialFriend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game
Burnham, T. C., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. L. S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00108-6 · Cited by 283 · see citing works
“(Forty-six percent is reported in McCabe et al. (1996), and 50 percent in Dickhaut et al.”
BackgroundGlobalization and human cooperation
Buchan, N. R., Grimalda, G. F., Wilson, R. K., Brewer, M. B., Fatás, E., & Foddy, M. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0809522106 · Cited by 289 · see citing works
Israel, S., Lerer, E., Shalev, I., Uzefovsky, F., Riebold, M., Laiba, E., Bachner-Melman, R., Maril, A., Bornstein, G., Knafo, A., et al. (2009) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005535 · Cited by 278 · see citing works
“Fund allocation in the Dictator Game is considered a real-life test of altruism since it involves a ‘put your money where your mouth is’ decision where giving to another is both costly and not subject to strategic considerations of reciprocity; this is particularly the case when ‘‘Dictator’’ and ‘‘Recipient’’ identiti…”
BackgroundOn the External Validity of Social Preference Games: A Systematic Lab-Field Study
Galizzi, M. M., & Navarro‐Martinez, D. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2908 · Cited by 267 · see citing works
“…by Levitt and List in the realm of social preferences, including studies on the effects of anonymity and scrutiny (Hoffman et al., 1994, 1996; Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Dana et al., 2006; Dana et al., 2007; List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008; Franzen and Pointer, 2012; Winking and Mizer, 2013); the…”
BackgroundShare and share alike? Gender-pairing, personality, and cognitive ability as determinants of giving
Ben‐Ner, A., Kong, F., & Putterman, L. G. (2003) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0167-4870(03)00065-5 · Cited by 252 · see citing works
The Dictator Game, Fairness and Ethnicity in Postwar Bosnia
Whitt, S., & Wilson, R. K. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00273.x · Cited by 269 · see citing works
Reciprocity, Self-interest, and the Welfare State
Fong, C. M., Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. M. (2004) · Nordisk tidskrift för politisk ekonomi · Cited by 250 · see citing works
The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation
Clark, K., & Sefton, M. (2001) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00588 · Cited by 247 · see citing works
“Falk and Fischbacher (1998) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) extend Rabin's analysis to sequential-move games of the type studied here.”
BackgroundHilbig, B. E., Zettler, I., Leist, F., & Heydasch, T. (2012) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2012.11.008 · Cited by 249 · see citing works
Burnham, T. C., & Hare, B. A. (2007) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-007-9012-2 · Cited by 250 · see citing works
“In other experimental settings, there is conflicting evidence, with some studies reporting a change in behavior owing to variations in subject-experimenter anonymity (Burnham 2003; Eckel and Grossman 1996; Hoffman et al. 1996a) and another reporting no effect (Bolton and Zwick 1995).”
BackgroundThe development of interpersonal strategy: Autism, theory-of-mind, cooperation and fairness
Sally, D., & Hill, E. L. (2005) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2005.06.015 · Cited by 247 · see citing works
“…setting of buying and selling (HoVman, McCabe, Shacat, & Smith, 1994); the frequency of altruistic grants is raised if the recipient is a charity (Eckel & Grossman, 1996) and if more personal characteristics of the recipient are identiWed (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Charness & Gneezy, forthcoming).”
BackgroundAn experimental test of the crowding out hypothesis
Eckel, C. C., Grossman, P. J., & Johnston, R. M. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.012 · Cited by 240 · see citing works
“We show in an earlier study that subjects donate significantly more when the recipient of their donation is a charitable organization rather than an anonymous subject (Eckel and Grossman, 1996).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationPro-social behavior in a natural setting
Frey, B. S., & Meier, S. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.10.001 · Cited by 229 · see citing works
“Eckel and Grossman (1996)show in an anonymous dictator game that contributions are much bigger if the subjects can give money to an established charity rather than to some student who does not need the money urgently.”
BackgroundMackie, G. L. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490293 · Cited by 240 · see citing works
Generosity and Philanthropy: A Literature ReviewPreprint
Bekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1015507 · Cited by 234 · see citing works
Reciprocity in a two-part dictator game
Ben‐Ner, A., Putterman, L. G., Kong, F., & Magan, D. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2002.12.001 · Cited by 228 · see citing works
“…is noticeably lower in observation by C of A's generosity toward B which is required by theories of indirect reciprocity such as that of Nowak and Sigmund (1998). most double-blind treatments (see Forsythe et al., 1994, Hoffman et al., 1994, Eckel and Grossman, 1996a, and Bolton et al., 1998).”
BackgroundMethodDishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India
Hanna, R., & Wang, S.-Y. (2017) · American Economic Journal Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20150029 · Cited by 235 · see citing works
“The subsequent adaptation to giving the money to a charity rather than other individuals is also fairly common in the literature (e.g., Eckel and Grossman 1996; Carpenter, Connolly, and Myers 2008). students and staff for their opinions on the most respected charities in Bangalore, in…”
BackgroundAltruistic behavior in a representative dictator experiment
Carpenter, J. P., Connolly, C., & Myers, C. K. (2008) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9193-x · Cited by 225 · see citing works
“Taking Eckel and Grossman (1996) as our starting point, we created a $100 dictator game in which participants first chose among the following 13 charities to take the role of the recipient: the American Cancer Society (ACS), the American Diabetes Association (ADA), Amnesty International (AI),…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMarket Signaling of Personal CharacteristicsPreprint
Fremling, G. M., & Posner, R. A. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.193490 · Cited by 186 · see citing works
The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
Barr, A. M., & Serra, D. (2009) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9 · Cited by 212 · see citing works
“Drawing on the discussions of Eckel and Grossman (1996) and Loomes (1999) AHS argued that by comparing behavior across the framed and unframed versions of the game they could identify the role played by 'social and psychological factors' (AHS, p. 104).”
Modeling Other-Regarding Preferences and an Experimental Test
Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J., & Kurki, A. (2004) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/b:puch.0000024169.08329.eb · Cited by 214 · see citing works
“Our results for the two room, nonproduction experiments replicated the experiments reported in Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996) as DB1 and in Eckel and Grossman (1996).”
ResultParsons, L. M. (2007) · Behavioral Research in Accounting · doi:10.2308/bria.2007.19.1.179 · Cited by 207 · see citing works
“Gordon and Khumawala (1999) note that individuals make charitable contributions for a number of reasons, including religious or spiritual obligation, social pressure, to curry favor with superiors, or due to general altruism.”
BackgroundEconomics and Social Interaction
(2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154 · Cited by 218 · see citing works
Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance
Bicchieri, C., Dimant, E., Gächter, S., & Nosenzo, D. (2021) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.012 · Cited by 202 · see citing works
A randomized trial of the effect of estrogen and testosterone on economic behavior
Zethraeus, N., Kočoska-Maraš, L., Ellingsen, T., von Schoultz, B., Hirschberg, A. L., & Johannesson, M. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0812757106 · Cited by 202 · see citing works
“A modified dictator game was used to measure altruistic behavior (21).”
How the Grapevine Keeps You in Line
Beersma, B., & Kleef, G. A. V. (2011) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550611405073 · Cited by 209 · see citing works
“After participants had seen the photos, they received instructions about the group task: a modified dictator game (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000).”
MethodWhat Determines Giving to Hurricane Katrina Victims? Experimental Evidence on Racial Group Loyalty
Fong, C. M., & Luttmer, E. F. P. (2009) · American Economic Journal Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.1.2.64 · Cited by 195 · see citing works
Fong, C. M. (2007) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02076.x · Cited by 207 · see citing works
Gender and competition in adolescence: task matters
Dreber, A., von Essen, E., & Ranehill, E. (2013) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-013-9361-0 · Cited by 191 · see citing works
“Having a charity rather than another participant as recipient might increase overall giving, as suggested by Eckel and Grossman (1996).”
BackgroundArginine Vasopressin and Oxytocin Modulate Human Social Behavior
Ebstein, R. P., Israel, S., Lerer, E., Uzefovsky, F., Shalev, I., Gritsenko, I., Riebold, M., Salomon, S., & Yirmiya, N. (2009) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04541.x · Cited by 194 · see citing works
Equitable decision making is associated with neural markers of intrinsic value
Zaki, J., & Mitchell, J. P. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1112324108 · Cited by 183 · see citing works
“These studies have produced mixed results: in some cases drastically (but not completely) reducing generosity in dictator games (36), in others leaving generosity unaffected (37), and in yet others demonstrating an effect mediated by other experimental factors such as receivers’ deservingness (38).”
ResultPromoting helping behavior with framing in dictator games
Brañas‐Garza, P. (2006) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2006.10.001 · Cited by 182 · see citing works
“The purpose of the sentence is to call the subject’s attention to a particular moral rule rather than to create a context in which that moral rule applies, as Eckel & Grossman (1996) and the other papers cited above did.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialContagion of pro- and anti-social behavior among peers and the role of social proximity
Dimant, E. (2019) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2019.04.009 · Cited by 181 · see citing works
Field Experiments in Economics
Carpenter, J. P., Harrison, G. W., & List, J. A. (2005) · Research in experimental economics · doi:10.1016/s0193-2306(2005)10 · Cited by 185 · see citing works
Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game
Piazza, J. R., & Bering, J. M. (2008) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002 · Cited by 183 · see citing works
“…task has been used extensively in economic game theory to investigate selfish motives in social exchange among adults (e.g., Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler,…”
BackgroundPoverty in dictator games: Awakening solidarity
Brañas‐Garza, P. (2005) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.10.005 · Cited by 179 · see citing works
What Do Laboratory Experiments Tell Us About the Real World
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2006) · Cited by 176 · see citing works
Does Heart or Head Rule Donor Behaviors in Charitable Crowdfunding Markets?
Gleasure, R., & Feller, J. (2016) · International Journal of Electronic Commerce · doi:10.1080/10864415.2016.1171975 · Cited by 174 · see citing works
“Further, because the natural-selection-based account predicts greater levels of altruism when the recipient is also perceived to be altruistic (rather than a member of a selfish group), support is also observed in dictator games that increased the “deservingness” of the responder by replacing them with a reputable cha…”
BackgroundVoting when money and morals conflict: an experimental test of expressive voting
Tyran, J. (2003) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00016-1 · Cited by 167 · see citing works
Brown, W. M., Palameta, B., & Moore, C. L. (2003) · Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1177/147470490300100104 · Cited by 172 · see citing works
Giving and volunteering in the Netherlands : Sociological and psychological perspectives
Bekkers, R. (2004) · Utrecht University Repository (Utrecht University) · Cited by 174 · see citing works
Fong, C. M., & Luttmer, E. F. P. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.010 · Cited by 172 · see citing works
“Meanwhile, findings from laboratory experiments on private giving of money show that subjects allocate more to recipients who, for various reasons, might be perceived as having greater moral worth (Hoffman et al., 1994; Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Fong, 2007; Cherry and Shogren, 2008; Fong and Oberholzer, 2009).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialStrategy and Fairness in Social Decision Making: Sometimes It Pays to Be Powerless
van Dijk, E., & Vermunt, R. C. (2000) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1006/jesp.1999.1392 · Cited by 167 · see citing works
Who gives what and when? A scenario study of intentions to give time and money
Bekkers, R. (2009) · Social Science Research · doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2009.08.008 · Cited by 164 · see citing works
Mixed feelings: Theories of and evidence on giving
Konow, J. (2009) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.11.008 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
“In a dictator game using a fixed $10 pie, Eckel and Grossman (1996) examined gifts of student dictators to other anonymous students in one treatment versus those to a known charity (the American Red Cross) in another.”
MethodEmpathy promotes altruistic behavior in economic interactions
Klimecki, O., Mayer, S. V., Jusyte, A., Scheeff, J., & Schönenberg, M. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep31961 · Cited by 159 · see citing works
“In contrast to previous work, which observed much lower levels of altruism with charities 21 or fictitious characters 22 as recipients, the present study reveals that altruism substantially increases when individuals divide real monetary stakes and when they are presented with visual displays of…”
NEEDS VERSUS ENTITLEMENTS-AN INTERNATIONAL FAIRNESS EXPERIMENT
Cappelen, A. W., Moene, K. O., Sørensen, E. Ø., et al. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12000 · Cited by 155 · see citing works
Economic and hypothetical dictator game experiments: Incentive effects at the individual level
Ben‐Ner, A., Kramer, A., & Levy, O. (2008) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2007.11.004 · Cited by 149 · see citing works
The Effects of Introducing Mixed Payment Systems for Physicians: Experimental Evidence
Brosig‐Koch, J., Hennig‐Schmidt, H., Kairies‐Schwarz, N., & Wiesen, D. (2015) · Health Economics · doi:10.1002/hec.3292 · Cited by 156 · see citing works
“(2011) and Eckel and Grossman (1996). To this end, one of the participants was randomly chosen to be a monitor.”
Altruism and social integration
Brañas‐Garza, P., Cobo‐Reyes, R., Espinosa, M. P., et al. (2009) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.014 · Cited by 147 · see citing works
“16See Ho¤man et al. (1996) and Eckel and Grossman (1996). increase of 52% in giving to rst-order neighbours rather than strangers.”
BackgroundDictator Games: A Meta StudyPreprint
Engel, C. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1568732 · Cited by 133 · see citing works
Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining
McCabe, K., Rassenti, S., & Smith, V. L. S. (1998) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1998.0638 · Cited by 140 · see citing works
Ferguson, E. (2015) · Transfusion Medicine · doi:10.1111/tme.12233 · Cited by 139 · see citing works
“The CDG is proposed as a more ecologically valid index of altruism (Eckel & Grossman, 1996).”
BackgroundMeasuring Altruistic Behavior in Surveys: The All-or-Nothing Dictator Game
Bekkers, R. (2007) · Survey research methods · doi:10.18148/srm/2007.v1i3.54 · Cited by 140 · see citing works
“Second, donation decisions were made anonymously, which lowers generosity (Eckel and Grossman 1996).”
InfluentialSelf‐other resonance, its control and prosocial inclinations: Brain–behavior relationships
Christov‐Moore, L., & Iacoboni, M. (2016) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.23119 · Cited by 134 · see citing works
“…these factors, we employed a modified Dictator game, a task thought to measure altruistic fairness, in which subjects show rich variation in response to context [Aguiar et al., 2008; Benenson et al., 2007; Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Hoffman et al., 1996; Liebe and Tutic, 2010; Weiland et al., 2012].”
MethodThe Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology
(2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108264822 · Cited by 140 · see citing works
A comprehensive comparison of students and non-students in classic experimental games
Belot, M. V. K., Duch, R. M., & Miller, L. (2015) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.02.007 · Cited by 128 · see citing works
“Dictator games in which the recipients are anonymous result in average donations between 10 and 15 percent (Hoffman et al., 1994, 1996; Eckel and Grossman, 1996).”
Background
- Authors
- Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J.
- Affiliations
- Virginia Tech (US)
- Wayne State University (US)
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-10
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 181-191
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2099209125
- Cited by
- 1,126
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 53 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 76 · 2019: 49 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 63 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 62 · 2014: 54 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 58
- FWCI
- 24.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- altruism, fairness, deservingness, charitable giving, donation behavior
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
