The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Emotional Hazard in a Power‐to‐Take Experiment
Open accessAbstract
In this experimental study of a two player power‐to‐take game, players earn an income in an individual effort task preceding the game. The game has two stages. First, one player can claim any part of the other’s income (take rate). Then, the latter player can respond by destroying own income. We focus on how emotions influence responses and show: (1) a higher take rate increases (decreases) intensity of negative (positive) emotions; (2) negative emotions drive destruction; (3) at high emotional intensity, responders destroy everything; (4) expectations affect the probability of punishment. Emotional hazard is identified as a new source of efficiency costs.
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Cites
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Third-party punishment and social norms
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(04)00005-4 · Cited by 2,417
Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
Zizzo, D. J. (2010) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z · Cited by 1,194
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13484 · Cited by 809
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (2006) · Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity · doi:10.1016/s1574-0714(06)01008-6 · Cited by 706
A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bosman, R., & Van Winden, F.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2002-01-01
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 476
- Pages
- 147-169
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2109728169
- Cited by
- 374
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 34.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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