CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 2,417Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationSocial Power and Status Dynamics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 88 of the 88 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Third-party punishment and social norms

Open access
Fehr, Ernst, Fischbacher, Urs·2004·Evolution and Human Behavior
DOI 10.1016/s1090-5138(04)00005-4
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/s1090-5138(04)00005-4

Cites

88 of 88 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life.

    “Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”

    From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [19]

  • People punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror.

    “Given existing work illustrating that people punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror 19 , 20 , 33 , we then tested whether an individual’s susceptibility to group influence hinges on whether they are a wronged victim or an unaffected juror (Experiments 3–4).”

    From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [19]

  • Donors are more generous if they learn that the recipient has recently made a donation to a charitable institution.

    “For example, donors are more generous if they learn that the recipient has recently made a donation to a charitable institution 72 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [72]

    The Results and dictator-game passages report transfers and punishment, but do not say whether recipients had previously donated to charity or whether donors learned of such donations. Searches for “donation to a charitable institution” and “recipient donated charity” found no passage addressing the claimed effect. (LLM, conf=0.76)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Messick, 1983, Solving social dilemmas—A review

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Metadata

Authors
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U.
Affiliations
University of Zurich (CH)
Corresponding author
Fehr, Ernst
ORCID
Venue
Evolution and Human Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2004-03
Volume
25
Issue
2
Pages
63-87
ISSN
1090-5138 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/s1090-5138(04)00005-4
OpenAlex
W2157228429
Cited by
2,417
References
88
Citations by year
2026: 77 · 2025: 132 · 2024: 154 · 2023: 152 · 2022: 143 · 2021: 172 · 2020: 195 · 2019: 164 · 2018: 111 · 2017: 112 · 2016: 106 · 2015: 129 · 2014: 122 · 2013: 96 · 2012: 101
FWCI
125.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Evolution and Human Behavior (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
Keywords
third-party punishment, social norms, strong reciprocity, cooperation norms, norm enforcement, second-party punishment, norm violation

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review