The Theory of Value‐Based Payment Incentives and Their Application to Health Care
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Objectives: To present the implications of agency theory in microeconomics, augmented by behavioral economics, for different methods of value‐based payment in health care; and to derive a set of future research questions and policy recommendations based on that conceptual analysis. Data Sources: Original literature of agency theory, and secondarily behavioral economics, combined with applied research and empirical evidence on the application of those principles to value‐based payment. Study Design: Conceptual analysis and targeted review of theoretical research and empirical literature relevant to value‐based payment in health care. Principal Findings: Agency theory and secondarily behavioral economics have powerful implications for design of value‐based payment in health care. To achieve improved value—better patient experience, clinical quality, health outcomes, and lower costs of care—high‐powered incentives should directly target improved care processes, enhanced patient experience, and create achievable benchmarks for improved outcomes. Differing forms of value‐based payment (e.g., shared savings and risk, reference pricing, capitation, and bundled payment), coupled with adjunct incentives for quality and efficiency, can be tailored to different market conditions and organizational settings. Conclusions: Payment contracts that are “incentive compatible”—which directly encourage better care and reduced cost, mitigate gaming, and selectively induce clinically efficient providers to participate—will focus differentially on evidence‐based care processes, will right‐size and structure incentives to avoid crowd‐out of providers’ intrinsic motivation, and will align patient incentives with value. Future research should address the details of putting these and related principles into practice; further, by deploying these insights in payment design, policy makers will improve health care value for patients and purchasers.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627 · Cited by 7,176 · cited 1×
“Put another way, will use of strong financial incentives tend to reduce providers’ commitment to professional norms and their inherent motivation to act first and foremost in patients’ interest (Benzer et al. 2013; Congleton 1991; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999)?”
BackgroundAnomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.1.193 · Cited by 5,019
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338 · cited 2×
“Prendergast (1999) highlights the need to identify “instruments” (exogenous variables beyond the provider’s immediate control that are correlated with the choice of payment incentive, but not with the results of interest).”
BackgroundThe effect of financial incentives on the quality of health care provided by primary care physicians
Scott, A., Sivey, P., Ait Ouakrim, D., Willenberg, L., Naccarella, L., Furler, J., & Young, D. (2011) · Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews · doi:10.1002/14651858.cd008451.pub2 · Cited by 568 · cited 1×
“Scott et al. (2011) observed that none of their reviewed studies addresses physician selection into or out of incentive arrangements.”
BackgroundKiefe, C. I., Allison, J. J., Williams, O. D., Person, S. D., Weaver, M. T., & Weissman, N. W. (2001) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/jama.285.22.2871 · Cited by 503
Hussey, P. S., Ridgely, M. S., & Rosenthal, M. B. (2011) · Health Affairs · doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2011.0784 · Cited by 127 · cited 1×
“Hussey, Ridgely, and Rosenthal (2011) observed a host of problems in the PROMETHEUS pilots: difficulties in defining the bundle (e.g., tying episodes of care to underlying episodes of illness, as opposed to an arbitrary time period); dealing with comorbid conditions; allocating accountability among…”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Conrad, D. A.
- Venue
- Health Services Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-11-09
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- S2
- Pages
- 2057-2089
- ISSN
- 0017-9124 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-6773
- OpenAlex
- W2133572411
- Cited by
- 197
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 17.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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