High‐Technology Intangibles and Analysts’ Forecasts
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This study examines the association between firms’ intangible assets and properties of the information contained in analysts’ earnings forecasts. We hypothesize that analysts will supplement firms’ financial information by placing greater relative emphasis on their own private (or idiosyncratic) information when deriving their earnings forecasts for firms with significant intangible assets. Our evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. We find that the consensus in analysts’ forecasts, measured as the correlation in analysts’ forecast errors, is negatively associated with a firm’s level of intangible assets. This result is robust to controlling for analyst uncertainty about a firm’s future earnings, which we also find to be higher for firms with high levels of internally generated (and expensed) intangibles. Given that analyst uncertainty increases and analyst consensus decreases with the level of a firm’s intangible assets, we also expect and find that the degree to which the mean forecast aggregates private information and is more accurate than an individual analyst’s forecast increases with a firm’s intangible assets. Finally, additional analysis reveals that lower levels of analyst consensus are associated with high‐technology manufacturing companies, and that this association is explained by the relatively high R&D expenditures made by these firms. Overall, our results are consistent with financial analysts augmenting the financial reporting systems of firms with higher levels of intangible assets (in terms of contributing to more accurate earnings expectations), particularly R&D‐driven high‐tech manufacturers.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
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The financial analyst forecasting literature: A taxonomy with suggestions for further research
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Cost Behavior and Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts
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Corporate governance and the quality of financial analysts’ information
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Self-citationChanges in Analysts' Information around Earnings Announcements
Barron, O. E., Byard, D., & Kim, O. (2002) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2002.77.4.821 · Cited by 248
Self-citationCustomer Satisfaction, Analyst Stock Recommendations, and Firm Value
Luo, X., Homburg, C., & Wieseke, J. (2010) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmkr.47.6.1041 · Cited by 210
“We measure analyst coverage as the number (in natural log) of financial analysts following or covering the stock of the firm (Barron et al. 2002).”
BackgroundGender Diversity in the Boardroom and Risk Management: A Case of R&D Investment
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Creative destruction and firm-specific performance heterogeneity☆
CHUN, H., KIM, J., MORCK, R., & YEUNG, B. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.06.005 · Cited by 174
“(2001) find similar results using stock returns; and Barron et al. (2002) link high R&D to the lack of consensus in analysts’ forecasts.”
ResultInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Barron, O. E., Byard, D., Kile, C., & Riedl, E. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-05
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 289-312
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-679X
- OpenAlex
- W2165944181
- Cited by
- 357
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 23.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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