Zombie Board: Board Tenure and Firm Performance
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We show that board tenure exhibits an inverted U‐shaped relation with firm value and accounting performance. The quality of corporate decisions, such as M&A, financial reporting quality, and CEO compensation, also has a quadratic relation with board tenure. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that directors’ on‐the‐job learning improves firm value up to a threshold, at which point entrenchment dominates and firm performance suffers. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a sample of firms in which an outside director suffered a sudden death, and find that sudden deaths that move board tenure away from (toward) the empirically observed optimum level in the cross‐section are associated with negative (positive) announcement returns. The quality of corporate decisions also follows an inverted U‐shaped pattern in a sample of firms affected by the death of a director.
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Cites
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Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices
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The costs of entrenched boards
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CEO Compensation and Board Structure
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Cited by
Types of director, board diversity and firm performance
Fernández-Temprano, M. A., & Tejerina-Gaite, F. (2020) · Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society · doi:10.1108/cg-03-2019-0096 · Cited by 309
Metadata
- Authors
- HUANG, S., & HILARY, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2018-07-04
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1285-1329
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-679X
- OpenAlex
- W2809819810
- Cited by
- 248
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 52.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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