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Cited by 993Corporate Finance and GovernanceCorporate Governance and Financial ManagementAuditing, Earnings Management, Governance

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The CEO pay slice

Open access
Bebchuk, Lucian A., Cremers, K.J. Martijn, Peyer, Urs C.·2011·Journal of Financial Economics
DOI 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.006
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Crossref · 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.006

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3 of 3 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • CPS represents CEO power, which has been found to have a negative effect on the monitoring power of boards, accounting profitability and stock returns.

    “Also, the CPS represents CEO power, which has been found to have a negative effect on the monitoring power of boards (Pathan 2009), accounting profitability and stock returns (Bebchuk et al. 2011).”

    From Bank failure prediction: corporate governance and financial indicators (2023) · cites this paper as Bebchuk et al. 2011

Citations

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Research works printed but not linked: 43

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  4. Bainbridge, 2002, Why a board? Group decision making in corporate governance, Vanderbilt Law Review, 55, 1
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  6. Bebchuk, L.A., Cremers, M., Peyer, U., 2007. CEO centrality. Discussion paper no. 13701. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. · DOI
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  20. Jenter, D., Kanaan F., 2006. CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation, Unpublished working paper. MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA. · DOI
  21. Kale, 2009, Rank order tournament and incentive alignment: the effect on firm performance, Journal of Finance, 64, 1479, 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01470.x · DOI
  22. Kaplan, S.N., Minton, B., 2006. How has CEO turnover changed? Increasingly performance sensitive boards and increasingly uneasy CEOs. Unpublished working paper 12465. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. · DOI
  23. Kaplan, 1997, Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 169, 10.1162/003355397555163 · DOI
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  25. Lang, 1991, A test of the free cash flow hypothesis: the case of bidder returns, Journal of Financial Economics, 29, 315, 10.1016/0304-405X(91)90005-5 · DOI
  26. Lie, 2005, On the timing of CEO stock option awards, Management Science, 51, 802, 10.1287/mnsc.1050.0365 · DOI
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  28. Masulis, 2007, Corporate governance and acquirer returns, Journal of Finance, 62, 1851, 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x · DOI
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Metadata

Authors
Bebchuk, L. A., Cremers, K. J. M., & Peyer, U. C.
Affiliations
National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
Corresponding author
Peyer, Urs C.
Venue
Journal of Financial Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2011-10
Volume
102
Issue
1
Pages
199-221
ISSN
0304-405X (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.006
OpenAlex
W3124807495
Cited by
993
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 88 · 2025: 88 · 2024: 78 · 2023: 70 · 2022: 78 · 2021: 89 · 2020: 77 · 2019: 69 · 2018: 71 · 2017: 58 · 2016: 46 · 2015: 34 · 2014: 54 · 2013: 33 · 2012: 37
FWCI
148.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
Keywords
CEO pay slice, executive compensation, CEO turnover, principal-agent problem, rent extraction, firm value, Tobin's Q, accounting profitability, option grants, proxy statements

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