The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does Corporate Diversification Destroy Value?
Open accessAbstract
We analyze several hundred firms that expand via acquisition and/or increase their number of business segments. The combined market reaction to acquisition announcements is positive but acquiring firm excess values decline after the diversifying event. Much of the excess value reduction occurs because our sample firms acquire already discounted business units, and not because diversifying destroys value. This implies that the standard assumption that conglomerate divisions can be benchmarked to typical stand‐alone firms should be carefully reconsidered. We also show that excess value does not decline when firms increase their number of business segments because of pure reporting changes.
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Citations
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Cited by
New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.103 · Cited by 2,798
Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction☆
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International Corporate Governance
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Agency, Information and Corporate Investment
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Explaining the Diversification Discount
Campa, J. M., & Kedia, S. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00476 · Cited by 1,345
Metadata
- Authors
- Graham, J. R., Lemmon, M. L., & Wolf, J. G.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-04
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 695-720
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3122502280
- Cited by
- 744
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 143.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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