The DOI matches its Crossref record; 63 of the 63 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness
Open accessAbstract
This study investigates the relation between corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness. We study a broad array of corporate political activities, including the employment of connected directors, campaign contributions, and lobbying. Using a large hand‐collected data set of U.S. firms' political connections, we find that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than nonconnected firms, after controlling for other determinants of tax aggressiveness, industry and year fixed effects, and the endogenous choice of being politically connected. Our findings are robust to various measures of political connections and tax aggressiveness. These results are consistent with the conjecture that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive because of their lower expected cost of tax enforcement, better information regarding tax law and enforcement changes, lower capital market pressure for transparency, and greater risk‐taking tendencies induced by political connections.
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Cites
Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches
Petersen, M. A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn053 · Cited by 10,746
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Faccio, M. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282806776157704 · Cited by 4,059
Estimating the Value of Political Connections
Fisman, R. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.4.1095 · Cited by 2,968
Hanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.002 · Cited by 2,888
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts
FACCIO, M., MASULIS, R. W., & McCONNELL, J. J. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01000.x · Cited by 2,561
Endogeneity in Empirical Corporate Finance1
Roberts, M. R., & Whited, T. M. (2013) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/b978-0-44-453594-8.00007-0 · Cited by 2,459
Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives
Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.02.002 · Cited by 2,170
Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis
Kim, J.-B., Li, Y., & Zhang, L. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.07.007 · Cited by 2,139
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Cited by
Customer–supplier relationships and corporate tax avoidance
Cen, L., Maydew, E. L., Zhang, L., & Zuo, L. (2017) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.09.009 · Cited by 438
Self-citationThe impact of corporate governance on corporate tax avoidance—A literature review
Kovermann, J., & Velte, P. (2019) · Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation · doi:10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2019.100270 · Cited by 407
CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH AGENDA
Wang, F., Xu, S., Sun, J., & Cullinan, C. P. (2020) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12347 · Cited by 294
Metadata
- Authors
- Kim, C. (., & Zhang, L.
- Venue
- Contemporary Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-07
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 78-114
- ISSN
- 0823-9150 (ISSN-L)
- 1911-3846
- OpenAlex
- W2785226087
- Cited by
- 514
- References
- 63
- FWCI
- 82.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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