The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How Do Interest Groups Seek Access to Committees?
Open accessAbstract
Concerns that interest groups use their financial resources to distort the democratic process are long‐standing. Surprisingly, though, firms spend little money on political campaigns, and roughly 95% of publicly traded firms in the United States have never contributed to a political campaign. Do interest groups seek political access through their modest contributions, or are these contributions only a minor and forgettable part of the political process? In this article, we present comprehensive evidence that interest groups are extremely sophisticated in the way they make campaign contributions. We collect a new data set on U.S. state legislative committee assignments and legislator procedural powers from 1988 to 2014, merged with campaign finance data, in order to analyze over 440,000 candidate–committee observations across 99 legislatures. Using a series of difference‐in‐differences designs based on changes in individual legislators' positions in the legislature, we not only show that interest groups seek out committee members, but we also show that they value what we call indirect access. When a legislator gains procedural powers, interest groups reallocate considerable amounts of money to her. The results reveal how interest groups in a wide range of democratic settings seek to influence the policy process not only by seeking direct access to policy makers but by seeking indirect access to legislative procedure as well.
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Cites
How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839588 · Cited by 10,641
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036932 · Cited by 638
Cited by
Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence
Bertrand, M., Bombardini, M., Fisman, R., & Trebbi, F. (2020) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20180615 · Cited by 271
Causal Panel Analysis under Parallel Trends: Lessons from a Large Reanalysis Study
CHIU, A., LAN, X., LIU, Z., & XU, Y. (2026) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055425000243 · Cited by 48
“Fouirnaies and Hall (2018) and Hall and Yoder (2022) are close to the 45-degree line but are not included in the figure as their TWFE z -scores exceed 15.”
Interest Group Activists and the Polarization of State Legislatures
Grumbach, J. M. (2020) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/lsq.12244 · Cited by 21
Social Media Data Reveal Patterns of Policy Engagement in State Legislatures
Casas, A., Payson, J., Nagler, J., Bonneau, R., & Tucker, J. A. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3698990 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Fouirnaies, A., & Hall, A. B.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2017-07-31
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 132-147
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W3123623881
- Cited by
- 180
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 11.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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