Interest Group Activists and the Polarization of State Legislatures
Abstract
Theories in campaign finance research suggest that interest group contributions moderate, and individual contributions polarize, state legislators. However, interest groups are comprised of individuals, and public opinion data suggest that group‐affiliated individual donors are more politically active and have especially extreme attitudes. This article investigates the relationship between group‐affiliated donors and legislative polarization in the U.S. states. In recent elections, individual contributors have grown more closely affiliated with activist organizations, such as environmental and anti‐abortion groups. Contributions from these group‐affiliated contributors predict legislative extremism at least as well as overall contributions from interest groups, individual donors, party committees, and party‐affiliated individuals. Using a novel data set of state legislative primary dates, results suggest that this relationship may be concentrated in the nomination process. Although the potential for endogeneity merits caution, the findings complicate theoretical firewalls between organizations and individuals in research on parties, interest groups, and campaign finance.
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Political investments by groups in the Democratic and Republican party coalitions have made the party coalitions more nationally coordinated.
“Political investments by groups in the Democratic and Republican party coalitions have made the party coalitions more nationally coordinated (Grumbach 2019; Hacker and Pierson 2020; Hertel-Fernandez 2019).”
From Laboratories of Democratic Backsliding (2023) · cites this paper as Grumbach 2019
Cites
HACKER, J. S. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055404001121 · Cited by 1,543 · see citing works
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
HALL, R. L., & DEARDORFF, A. V. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062010 · Cited by 1,172 · see citing works
Bonica, A. (2016) · Business and Politics · doi:10.1515/bap-2016-0004 · Cited by 147 · see citing works
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Laboratories of Democratic Backsliding
GRUMBACH, J. M. (2023) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055422000934 · Cited by 135 · see citing works
“Political investments by groups in the Democratic and Republican party coalitions have made the party coalitions more nationally coordinated (Grumbach 2019; Hacker and Pierson 2020; Hertel-Fernandez 2019).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
- Authors
- Grumbach, J. M.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Grumbach, Jacob M.
- ORCID
- Grumbach, Jacob M.
- Venue
- Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2019-06
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-34
- ISSN
- 0362-9805 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-9162
- OpenAlex
- W2947132090
- Cited by
- 21
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 5 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 7
- FWCI
- 11.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Legislative Studies Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- legislative polarization, state legislatures, campaign finance, primary elections, nomination process, environmental organizations, Party committee
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