The Selective Laziness of Reasoning
Abstract
Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this “selective laziness,” we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was someone else's. Among those participants who accepted the manipulation and thus thought they were evaluating someone else's argument, more than half (56% and 58%) rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Moreover, participants were more likely to reject their own arguments for invalid than for valid answers. This demonstrates that people are more critical of other people's arguments than of their own, without being overly critical: They are better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's rather than their own.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Trouche et al. (2016) found that subjects are less critical of their own arguments than of other people's.
“This suggests that subjects are less critical of their own arguments than of other people's, indicating that confirmation bias is real and perhaps often operative when we are considering our own claims and arguments.”
From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Trouche et al. (2016)
About half of Trouche et al.'s participants did not notice that they were presented with their own arguments again.
“About half of the participants didn't notice that by the experimenter's intervention, in some trials, they were in fact presented with their own arguments again; the arguments appeared to these participants as if they were someone else's.”
From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Trouche et al. (2016)
More than half of subjects who believed they were assessing someone else's arguments rejected those that were in fact their own, and were more likely to do so for invalid than valid ones.
“Furthermore, more than half of the subjects who believed they were assessing someone else's arguments now rejected those that were in fact their own, and were more likely to do so for invalid than for valid ones.”
From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Trouche et al. (2016)
If bias functions to boost one's own conviction to facilitate SFPs, then laziness in critical thinking about one's own positions shouldn't be surprising.
“But if the bias functions to boost primarily only one's own conviction about particular beliefs so as to facilitate SFPs then 'laziness' in critical thinking about one's own positions (Trouche et al. 2016) shouldn't be surprising.”
From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Trouche et al. 2016
Cites
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137 · see citing works
Rationality and the Reflective Mind
Stanovich, K. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.001.0001 · Cited by 1,041 · see citing works
Lifting the Veil of Morality: Choice Blindness and Attitude Reversals on a Self-Transforming Survey
Hall, L., Johansson, P., & Strandberg, T. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045457 · Cited by 192 · see citing works
Self-citation
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
ECHO CHAMBERS AND EPISTEMIC BUBBLES
Nguyen, C. T. (2020) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2018.32 · Cited by 1,115 · see citing works
What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias?
Peters, U. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00252-1 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
- Authors
- Trouche, E., Johansson, P., Hall, L., & Mercier, H.
- Affiliations
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Uppsala University (SE)
- Lund University (SE)
- University of Neuchâtel (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Mercier, Hugo
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-10-09
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 2122-2136
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W2147486919
- Cited by
- 111
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 43 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 7
- FWCI
- 13.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Lund University Publications (Lund University) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Swiss National Science Fund
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- argument evaluation, choice blindness, reasoning, argument validity, self-other differences, reasoning errors
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Choice Behavior, Female, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Problem Solving, Thinking, Young Adult
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review