Cited by 111Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsLogic, Reasoning, and KnowledgeEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

The Selective Laziness of Reasoning

Trouche, Emmanuel, Johansson, Petter, Hall, Lars, Mercier, Hugo·2016·Cognitive Science

Abstract

Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this “selective laziness,” we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was someone else's. Among those participants who accepted the manipulation and thus thought they were evaluating someone else's argument, more than half (56% and 58%) rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Moreover, participants were more likely to reject their own arguments for invalid than for valid answers. This demonstrates that people are more critical of other people's arguments than of their own, without being overly critical: They are better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's rather than their own.

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Crossref · 10.1111/cogs.12303

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  • Trouche et al. (2016) found that subjects are less critical of their own arguments than of other people's.

    “This suggests that subjects are less critical of their own arguments than of other people's, indicating that confirmation bias is real and perhaps often operative when we are considering our own claims and arguments.”

    From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Trouche et al. (2016)

  • About half of Trouche et al.'s participants did not notice that they were presented with their own arguments again.

    “About half of the participants didn't notice that by the experimenter's intervention, in some trials, they were in fact presented with their own arguments again; the arguments appeared to these participants as if they were someone else's.”

    From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Trouche et al. (2016)

  • More than half of subjects who believed they were assessing someone else's arguments rejected those that were in fact their own, and were more likely to do so for invalid than valid ones.

    “Furthermore, more than half of the subjects who believed they were assessing someone else's arguments now rejected those that were in fact their own, and were more likely to do so for invalid than for valid ones.”

    From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Trouche et al. (2016)

  • If bias functions to boost one's own conviction to facilitate SFPs, then laziness in critical thinking about one's own positions shouldn't be surprising.

    “But if the bias functions to boost primarily only one's own conviction about particular beliefs so as to facilitate SFPs then 'laziness' in critical thinking about one's own positions (Trouche et al. 2016) shouldn't be surprising.”

    From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Trouche et al. 2016

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Authors
Trouche, E., Johansson, P., Hall, L., & Mercier, H.
Affiliations
  • Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
  • Uppsala University (SE)
  • Lund University (SE)
  • University of Neuchâtel (CH)
Corresponding author
Mercier, Hugo
Venue
Cognitive Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2015-10-09
Volume
40
Issue
8
Pages
2122-2136
ISSN
  • 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
  • 1551-6709
OpenAlex
W2147486919
Cited by
111
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 43 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 7
FWCI
13.13
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Lund University Publications (Lund University) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Swiss National Science Fund
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
argument evaluation, choice blindness, reasoning, argument validity, self-other differences, reasoning errors
MeSH terms
Adult, Choice Behavior, Female, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Problem Solving, Thinking, Young Adult

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