The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Two Second‐Personal Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons
Abstract
In spite of the burgeoning philosophical literature on human dignity, Stephen Darwall's second‐personal account of the dignity of persons has not received the attention it deserves. This article investigates Darwall's account and argues that it faces a dilemma, for it succumbs either to a problem of antecedence or to the wrong kind of reasons problem. But this need not mean one should reject a second‐personal account. Instead, I argue that an alternative second‐personal conception, one I will call relational, promises to solve the dilemma by avoiding both the problem of antecedence and the wrong kind of reasons problem. More generally, distinguishing these two second‐personal conceptions of the dignity of persons is important to enrich the available philosophical accounts of human dignity.
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“This framing aligns with work showing that dignity depends on how we relate to one another and how we acknowledge each other's claims and standing [131, 152].”
From Understanding Teen Overreliance on AI Companion Chatbots Through Self-Reported Reddit Narratives (2026) · cites this paper as [152]
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Research works printed but not linked: 29
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Cited by
Understanding Teen Overreliance on AI Companion Chatbots Through Self-Reported Reddit Narratives
Namvarpour, M. (., Brofsky, B., Medina, J. Y., Akter, M., & Razi, A. (2026) · Proceedings of the 2026 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3772318.3790597 · Cited by 24
AI Mimicry and Human Dignity: Chatbot Use as a Violation of Self‐Respect
van der Rijt, J., Coelho Mollo, D., & Vaassen, B. (2026) · Journal of Applied Philosophy · doi:10.1111/japp.70037 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- Zylberman, A.
- Affiliations
- Department of Philosophy and School of Law UCLA
- Venue
- European Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2017-04-12
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 921-943
- ISSN
- 0966-8373
- 1468-0378
- Cited by
- 14
- References
- 0
- Language
- en
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