Monty Hall, Doomsday and confirmation
Open accessAbstract
monty hall, doomsday and confirmation 23In sum, then, Chalmers's attempt to argue against physicalism based on the conceivability of zombies misses the mark.His version of conceivability does indeed imply possibility, but at the cost of making it unclear whether zombies are indeed conceivable.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Bradley and Fitelson admit that they need to assume a thesis about prior or intrinsic probability anyway, namely their assumption (7).
“Indeed, Bradley and Fitelson admit (p.29) that they need to assume a thesis about prior or intrinsic probability anyway, viz.their assumption (7).”
From The nomological argument for the existence of God (2022) · cites this paper as Bradley and Fitelson (2003)
The standard view of the Monty Hall Problem holds that one is initially justified in assigning 1/3 probability to the car's being behind any particular door.
“In turn, the standard view of the Monty Hall Problem holds that one is initially justified in assigning ⅓ probability to the car's being behind any particular door.”
From The nomological argument for the existence of God (2022) · cites this paper as Bradley and Fitelson (2003)
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The nomological argument for the existence of God
Hildebrand, T., & Metcalf, T. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12364 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
- Authors
- Bradley, D., & Fitelson, B.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Venue
- Analysis
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-01
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 277
- Pages
- 23-31
- ISSN
- 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8284
- OpenAlex
- W2018842381
- Cited by
- 25
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2021: 1 · 2020: 12 · 2015: 1 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 1.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philarchive.org
- Locations
- Analysis (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Keywords
- Monty Hall problem, doomsday argument, confirmation, conceivability, zombie argument, physicalism, conceivability argument, possibility
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
